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I. INTRODUCTION
The effects of the new economy, most importantly the explo-
sion of free trade and electronic commerce, increasingly connect
the people in the Western Hemisphere to each other. Globaliza-
tion has facilitated the growth of global capitalism, the informa-
tion revolution, travel, and the blurring of national and
subnational boundaries. Globalization has rendered meaningless
the boundaries between domestic and foreign matters. Similarly,
the distinctions of such boundaries among criminals, crime, and
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criminal justice are also increasingly broken or meaningless.1 The
rise of transnational crime and criminal organizations threaten
the expansion of international trade and the new global landscape
of the World Trade Organization and regional integration.2
Nation-states and international organizations are recognizing
that transnational organized crime threatens to destabilize
weaker nations. It also threatens global free trade and fair eco-
nomic competition, while creating great social, economic, and
political costs at home and abroad. In addition, the emergence of
transnational networks of organized crime reduces the quality of
political, civil, and economic interactions across the entire global
community of nations.'
International law enforcement cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere is a function of several disciplines reflecting histori-
cal approaches, comparative contemporary approaches, criminal
justice and harmonization of the criminal justice systems,
national and regional security policies, foreign police assistance,
the roles of major international organizations, such as the Organi-
zation of the American States (OAS), and the movement toward
democratization and administration of justice. The lack of a
coherent approach and the absence of definitive accounts make
this discussion necessarily tentative.
This article will review potential approaches to international
enforcement cooperation in the Americas. In particular, Part II
will discuss efforts to harmonize criminal justice systems in the
Americas in the context of increasing integration. Parts III, IV
and V will highlight the importance of national, bilateral and
regional security issues, confidence building, and the role of the
OAS. Part V will consider in greater detail the historical and cur-
rent role of the OAS; the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD); the codification of international law; the
Inter-American Human Rights System; as well as potential future
roles for those entities. Parts VI and VII will discuss more com-
prehensive approaches to criminal cooperation and administra-
tion of justice, such as meetings of the Ministers of Justices of the
Hemisphere (REMJA), the establishment of Justice Study Cen-
ters, and hemispheric work on selected single crime issues. The
1. William F. McDonald, The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier Is
the Frontier, 1 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 1, 6-7 (Spring 1995).
2. Dick Thornburgh, The Internationalization of Business Crime, 1
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 23, 23 (Spring 1995).
3. Peter A. Lupsha, Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation-State, 2
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, 21, 24-25 (Spring 1996).
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conclusion of Part VIII will provide some general analysis and
prospects.
II. EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
IN THE AMERICAS IN THE CONTEXT
OF INCREASING INTEGRATION
Harmonization of criminal justice systems in the Americas
has proceeded much more slowly than in Europe. Significant dif-
ferences in the environments between Europe and the Americas
can explain the slower pace in the Americas. Economic integra-
tion, transportation and communication systems have been com-
paratively less developed in the Americas than in Europe. The
United States has dominated and exerted controlling influence
over the efforts to evolve the hemisphere's criminal justice
towards harmonization and improve international criminal coop-
eration. Historically, international criminal cooperation and crim-
inal justice harmonization in the Americas has been a function of
several currents: unification of the law projects, mainly led by the
Organization of American States; foreign police assistance efforts;
ad hoc initiatives against certain crimes, such as narcotics traf-
ficking; and law, development, and administration of justice pro-
gram. Most importantly, the elements propelling European
harmonization of criminal policies and laws have been the unique
institutional mechanisms and legal frameworks.
A. Cooperation in Procedural and Substantive
Criminal Law
Historically, governments in the Americas have cooperated in
matters of procedural and substantive criminal law. The OAS and
the United States have played key roles in this regard. Procedu-
ral international criminal law refers to those matters of interna-
tional criminal law that deal mainly with procedural matters,
such as: gathering evidence (normally through unilateral mea-
sures, rogatory letters, and judicial and mutual assistance in
criminal matters); obtaining custody of a person charged with a
crime through extradition or alternatives thereto (including
deportation, handing over, and forced or fraudulent kidnapping);
transfer of proceedings; recognition and enforcement of criminal
judgments; and transfer of prisoners. Substantive international
criminal law embraces substantive crimes of particular interna-
tional interest, such as: narcotics trafficking; smuggling of aliens,
especially children and women; arms trafficking; terrorism;
4252006]
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money laundering; securities and commodities futures crimes;
customs crimes; thefts of airplanes and automobiles; and thefts of
cultural property.
Cooperation in the Americas has existed with regard to extra-
dition. For example, in 1889, five Latin American governments
signed the Treaty of International Penal Law, which included
numerous articles on extradition.4
In 1889, five Latin American governments signed a Treaty of
International Penal Law, which included numerous articles on
extradition.5 This, however, was just the first of numerous multi-
lateral extradition treaties signed by Latin American govern-
ments during the first third of the twentieth century. In 1902,
representatives of seventeen Latin American countries, including
the United States, concluded a Treaty for the Extradition of
Criminals and for Protection Against Anarchism.6 Then, in 1911,
five Latin American governments concluded an extradition agree-
ment.7 In 1928, sixteen Latin American governments met in
Havana and signed the Bustamante Code of Private International
Law, which included some three dozen extradition clauses.8 In
1933, the U.S. and Latin American governments signed the Mon-
tevideo Convention on Extradition, and, in 1934, five Central
American governments concluded a multilateral extradition
treaty.9 Hence, during the first third of the twentieth century, a
number of multilateral extradition treaties were in force. In addi-
tion, bilateral treaties with countries within and outside the hemi-
sphere supplemented multilateral cooperation.1"
The most controversial issue with respect to extradition has
been the tradition and legal prohibition against extraditing
nationals in many civil law countries. Gradually, many of these
countries have changed the prohibition, and will extradite nation-
als, at least for certain serious crimes."
Latin American governments also participated modestly in
other international criminal law enforcement matters, attending
4. Ethan Nadelmann, Harmonization of Criminal Justice Systems, in THE








11. See Michael Plachta, (Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 77, 77 (1999).
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international conferences on various criminal subjects, such as the
1904 convention on the suppression of the white slave trade.12 In
Buenos Aires in 1905, representatives of the police departments of
La Plata, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and the host city
signed a draft "International Police Convention" providing for the
exchange of criminal records of dangerous offenders.13 Fifteen
years later, the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the convention, although
there exists little evidence on its implementation. 14
Cooperative efforts against narcotics trafficking and money
laundering became increasingly important in the 1980s. The
establishment of a formal program and the institutionalization of
counter-drug work in the form of the establishment of the Inter-
American Drug Control Commission (CICAD) have catapulted
these issues into the forefront. In addition, many other anti-crime
initiatives (e.g., arms trafficking) have been linked to CICAD's
work. Still other substantive areas of hemispheric cooperation
include anti-corruption and counter-terrorism. There are draft
OAS conventions on both subjects. 5
B. Foreign Police Assistance
Latin American countries generally followed the lead of
Europe and the United States in policing. 6 "The U.S. government
started providing police assistance during the first decades of the
century, when U.S. marines occupied Caribbean and Central
American countries to promote internal security and U.S.
interests."17
In addition, in the first third of the twentieth century, the
United States established police constabularies in its dependen-
cies in the Greater Antilles and Central America." As a result of
these constabularies, the United States established influence over
the police forces of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.' 9
The U.S. dominance of the Panamanian policy constabulary
helped the United States guard U.S. construction and operation of
12. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 265.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 269.
16. Id. at 265.
17. Id.
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the Panama Canal.2" Just before and during World War II, U.S.
assistance to involvement with Latin American police enabled the
United States to obtain information, especially with respect to
Communist organizing and fascist espionage activities.2' During
the post-World War II period, United States training of Latin
American police had as its goal the eradication of the threat of
left-wing subversion and armed guerrilla insurgency.22
Since World War II, the United States has exerted significant
influence on criminal justice in the hemisphere. 23 In 1940, expan-
sion of U.S. police activities in Latin America began when Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt assigned all intelligence responsibilities
for the Western Hemisphere to the FBI.24 "Shortly thereafter, J.
Edgar Hoover established a Special Intelligence Service (SIS) to
[start] countering Axis activities in South and Central America.
Within a few years, three hundred sixty agents were stationed
throughout the region, especially in Mexico, Argentina, and Bra-
zil."25 While "some operated undercover, others served openly as
legal attaches in U.S. embassies and liaison officers with foreign
police forces."26 The SIS worked closely with the British Security
Coordination (BSC), the U.S.-based British intelligence agency.27
Agents helped foil a planned coup d'6tat by pro-Axis forces in
Bolivia, contributed to the government's shift away from its initial
support for Germany in Chile, and helped friendly governments
jail or deport pro-Axis individuals.2" "Local police were cultivated
with money and invitations to the National Police Academy in
Washington. Throughout the war a network of FBI-trained police
[developed] that would continue to aid the FBI's more mundane
law enforcement efforts in peacetime."29
After World War II, the SIS was disbanded. While many of
its agents started working for the new CIA, a few remained with




23. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 266 (citing, inter alia, STANLEY E. HILTON,
HITLER'S SECRET WAR IN SOUTH AMERICA 1939-1945: GERMAN MILITARY ESPIONAGE





28. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 266-67.
29. Id. at 267.
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international network of legal attaches (known as LEGATs)20
More importantly, in 1955, the United States started the Civil
Police Administration (CPA) and expanded thereafter with the
creation of the Office of Public Safety (OPS) in 1962.31 Adminis-
tered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
OPS had the mission of centralizing all police assistance to foreign
countries.2 The OPS gave aid to police agencies in approximately
fifty countries, including virtually all of Latin America, at a cost of
more than US$300 million for training, weaponry, and telecom-
munications and other equipment. 31 "Hundreds of active and
retired American police officers [went abroad], where they trained
tens of thousands of police officials in administration, riot and
traffic control, interrogation, surveillance, intelligence, and . . .
other tasks."34 The OPS brought mid- and high-level police offi-
cials from Latin American countries to the Inter-American Police
Academy in the Panama Canal Zone and, after it was closed, to
Washington to study at the OPS-operated International Police
Academy.3
In 1974, the Public Safety program stopped due to human
rights scandals. Congress immediately exempted narcotics con-
trol.36 Although the Public Safety program had only a modest
effect on the development of criminal justice norms and institu-
tions in Latin America, it did facilitate regular interaction
between U.S. and Latin American police. 7
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) replaced
the Public Safety program after it underwent a dramatic interna-
tional expansion. 8
Between 1969 and 1975, the number of U.S. drug enforce-
ment agents stationed abroad rose from about two dozen to
two hundred - approximately half of whom were distrib-
uted throughout most major cities in Latin America. Dur-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF




36. HUGGINS, supra note 21, at 5; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
STOPPING U.S. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN POLICE AND PRISONS (1976); MICHAEL T.
KLARE & CYNTHIA ARANSON, SUPPLYING REPRESSION: U.S. SUPPORT FOR
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ABROAD 22 (1981); Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 267.
37. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 267.
38. Id.
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ing the same six-year period, the number of foreign police
officials trained by the DEA... in both U.S. and in-country
schools rose from zero to over two thousand per year before
declining somewhat in the latter half of the 1970s. 9
Within the "overlapping set of U.S. agencies and indi-
viduals assisting foreign police, the Justice Department's
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP) has emerged in the 1990s as a primary
coordinator of U.S. assistance to foreign police. Established
in 1986 under the administration of the [U.S.] Department
of Justice, ICITAP operates with policy guidance from the
Department of State. ICITAP funding comes from the
United States Agency for International Development, chan-
neled through the State Department. ICITAP's objective is
to train foreign police, prosecutors, judges, and other crimi-
nal justice personnel to further the "rule of law" in their
countries. [In contrast to] its Cold War predecessor,... the
Agency for International Development's Office of Public
Safety (OPS) (1962-74), ICITAP aims at promoting peaceful
respect for the "rule of law." [The Agency for International
Development] had focused on counterinsurgency as a
means of blocking the spread of international Communism.
[However], both of these foreign police assistance initia-
tives share a common foreign policy objective: developing,
enhancing, and protecting U.S. interests abroad and pro-
moting abroad and [in the United States] images of
"national security."4°
The U.S. Customs Service has also conducted training.
Rather than broad training in police capabilities generally, and
counterinsurgency capabilities in particular, the training has
focused increasingly on drug enforcement agencies and tasks.
United States drug enforcement officials, whose goal was to
internationalize counter-drug efforts, especially interdiction,
investigation, and prosecution of drug traffickers, took other steps
to promote inter-American police relations. The United States
convoked annual International Drug Enforcement Conference
(IDEC) meetings of top-level Latin American, U.S. and European
police officials.4' Eventually, European governments started sta-
tioning their own police liaisons in Latin American capitals and
39. Id. at 268 (citing federal appropriations hearings).
40. HUGGINS, supra note 21, at 2 (internal citations omitted).
41. See generally U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, International Drug




participating in Latin American drug control efforts.42
By the early 1990s, "more than fifteen years after Congress
had eliminated programs to assist foreign policies, the United
States had 125 police assistance programs abroad."43 These initia-
tives "were justified as legitimately exempted from the 1973 and
1974 laws abolishing U.S. assistance to foreign police. The new
police assistance programs aim at a range of problems from com-
bating common and organized crime and 'gangsterism' to 'terror-
ism' and drugs."44 Diverse U.S. government and civilian police
specialists continue such assistance today.
Through the Department of Defense Program to Assist
National Police Forces, the United States has thoroughly reorga-
nized indigenous police forces in a number of foreign countries,
including Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama and
Mexico.4u
In the Caribbean, especially the Eastern Caribbean, U.S. mil-
itary and civilian police specialists have conducted police training
on diverse issues, including counter-drug control, customs train-
ing, maritime enforcement, counter-terrorism, and assistance
directed at various types of police training.46
During the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. proactively urged coun-
tries in the Americas bilaterally and multilaterally through the
U.N. drug control agencies, Interpol, and the OAS to sign, ratify
and implement the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, strengthen counter-
drug policy legislation and enforcement efforts.
Some hemispheric efforts in police cooperation in the 1980s
were broader than just drug enforcement. The U.N. Institute for
Latin America on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders
(ILANUD), founded during the 1960s and headquartered in Costa
Rica, has been active in promoting the strengthening of criminal
42. See id.
43. HUGGINS, supra note 21, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN AID: POLICE TRAINING
AND ASSISTANCE, GAO/NSIAD-92-118 (1992).
46. For a view of the Caribbean in the context of U.S. security, especially U.S.
prioritization of counter-drug assistance, see Ivelaw Griffith, The Caribbean in a New
Strategic Environment, in STRATEGIC BALANCE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
IN THE AMERICAS 76-91 (Francisco Rojas Aravena, Ralph H. Espach & Joseph J.
Tulchin eds., 1998). See also Michael J. Kryzanek, The Grenada Invasion:
Approaches to Understanding, in UNITED STATES POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 58-79
(John D. Martz ed., 1995) (discussing U.S. low intensity warfare and cooperation with
the region in the Grenada invasion).
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justice systems in the region.47 During the 1980s, Interpol's
efforts to strengthen regional operations helped to establish liai-
son offices and regional telecommunications center outside
Europe, including one in Buenos Aires.48 During this time, U.S.
efforts to suppress and prosecute terrorist activities in Central
America led to the revival of OPS-type training programs during
the Reagan administration. 9
The State Department's Administration of Justice projects
encouraged judicial reform projects, which included moderniza-
tion and reform of laws, including criminal justice laws. "[Als a
foreign policy instrument, police assistance has the advantage of
appearing to be a relatively benign and low-key form of U.S. inter-
vention." ° A popular argument in favor of foreign police assis-
tance is that such aid "will make recipient police forces more
democratic, less violent, less corrupt and more professional.""'
Additionally, proponents argue that:
[T]he U.S. image abroad and at home can be (at least ini-
tially) bolstered by such relatively invisible intervention.
In contrast, military incursions.., are highly visible forms
of U.S. intervention, often very unpopular at home and
abroad, with potentially serious consequences for U.S.
politics and the U.S.' image in the world. Police assistance
can accomplish many of the same foreign policy objectives
as military intervention while appearing less political in
the process."
C. Administration of Justice Programs
The U.S. administration of justice (AOJ) programs, which
arose out of U.S. democracy assistance programs in the 1980s,
overlap and coalesce with the U.S. assistance to foreign police pro-
grams. A review of the AOJ programs helps reveal the roots and
orientation of the foreign police assistance programs, although the
latter predated the AOJ programs.
The largest of the U.S. democracy assistance projects in
the Americas in the 1980s was the administration of justice
47. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 269.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Jim Lobe, Anne Manuel & David Holliday, Police Aid and Political
Will: U.S. Policy in El Salvador and Honduras (1962-1987) (Washington Office on
Latin America, Nov. 1987).
50. HUGGINS, supra note 21, at 3.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3-4.
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program, an inter-agency initiative implemented by AID,
the State Department, [the United States Information
Agency] (USIA), and the Justice Department. The main
element of this program was assistance to the judicial sys-
tems of Latin America and the Caribbean to help them
improve the administration of justice in their respective
countries. A related emphasis was training in criminal
investigative skills for police forces of the region. Planning
for the administration of justice program got underway in
1983.... The first project was initiated in 1984. [B]y 1987,
the program's annual budget had reached $20 million. By
the end of 1988 over $60 million had been obligated under
the program, approximately $50 million for judicial sys-
tems and $10 million for police training. 3
The idea of U.S. judicial assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean first arose in the 1980s, in connection with Congres-
sional pressure on the State Department to take action on the Sal-
vadoran government's lack of progress on several high-profile
murder cases of special interest to the U.S., such as the December
1980 murder of four U.S. nuns, the 1980 murder of Archbishop
Romero, and the Sheraton murders (the 1981 murder of the head
of the Salvadoran land reform program and two AFL-CIO officials
advising on that program).54 "U.S. officials [believed] that the civil
war in El Salvador had led to a breakdown of the judicial system
and that this breakdown was a major cause of the death squad
violence wracking the country.""
Although the decision to pursue judicial assistance was stim-
ulated by a specific need to address right-wing political violence in
El Salvador, from the start the administration of justice program
was conceived as a long-term, region-wide democratic develop-
ment program. The AOJ program was also politically designed to
persuade a U.S. Congress controlled by Democrats to appropriate
a costly program largely geared to funding military aid to the
authoritarian regimes to repress leftist insurgencies raging in
Central America. The AOJ program was one of the recommenda-
tions of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America,
popularly known as the Kissinger Commission, to formulate a
bipartisan policy approach to Central America." The Mexican
53. THOMAS CAROTHERS, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN
AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS 210 (1991) (internal citation omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 211.
56. 3 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 12 (1985) ("The Commission noted that the
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Government joined the initiative of the Contadora Group and sev-
eral European countries in promoting the peace process by avert-
ing the spread of armed conflict and opposing the Reagan
doctrine, causing tension between the United States and Mexico.
5 7
An inter-agency working group headed by the Principal Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs devel-
oped operational principles for the administration of justice
program to avoid repeating the mistakes of the prior law and
development program of the late 1960s and early 1970s to Latin
America. These were: (1) assist hemispheric governments
strengthen their legal systems using their own goals and values
rather than try to export U.S. legal models; (2) support existing
institutions rather than create new ones; (3) emphasize practical
goals connected with developmental objectives; and (4) limit judi-
cial assistance only to countries that have elected civilian
governments.5"
In 1984, the Salvadoran project was hurriedly devised, using
congressional earmarks for its $9.2 million funding.59 Spurred by
a desire to achieve progress in high-profile murder cases, "the pro-
ject foresaw the establishment of an investigative commission,
which was to consist of an elite police unit under civilian control
(the Special Investigative Unit) and a forensic team to [assist] the
Salvadoran government."6 The project also called for the forma-
tion of a judicial protection unit to protect participants in sensitive
trials and provided for the establishment of a law reform commis-
sion and a judicial training program.6' Such programs continued
to grow.62
judicial systems in the region operate under 'physical, financial and personnel
conditions which range from severely inadequate to virtually neglected.'" It
"recommended assistance to the region's legal systems, with emphasis on the criminal
justice subsector." It noted the latter "is the most frequent point of contact with the
coercive power of the government for the bulk of the disadvantaged population."). For
additional background on the integration of the AOJ program into the Reagan
doctrine, see generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, THE REAGAN YEARS: THE 1980s,
EXPORTING DEMOCRACY THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: THEMES AND ISSUES
90-122 (Abraham F. Lowenthal ed., 1991).
57. Jestis Hernndez, Mexican and U.S. Policy Toward Central America, in THE
DIFFICULT TRIANGLE: MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES 13, 31-33
(H. Rodrigo Jauberth et al. eds., 1992).
58. CAROTHERS, supra note 53, at 211.
59. Id. at 211-12.
60. Id. at 212.
61. Id.
62. For a discussion of the Caribbean AOJ project, see Bruce Zagaris, Law and
Development or Comparative Law and Social Change - The Application of Old
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In January 1985, AID created an administration of justice
office in its Latin America and Caribbean bureau and
folded into it the existing democratic assistance programs,
in particular the human rights and democratic participa-
tion programs. In March 1985 AID started the Regional
Administration of Justice Project, a $9.6 million, five-year
judicial assistance based at a small U.N. institute in Costa
Rica (the United Nations Institute for the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of the Offender [ILANUD]). Under
this program, ILANUD offers training courses for judges,
prosecutors, and other legal personnel as well as a range of
technical assistance to courts and justice ministries on such
issues as case management, legal data bases, and law
libraries.
The Project also provided support services to strengthen ILANUD
as an indigenous regional institution committed to Project goals
and the establishment of an extension facility at ILANUD to chan-
nel immediate direct funding to national institutions to meet
country-specific needs.6
Police training constituted a major subcomponent of the
administration of justice program. The incapacities of the Salva-
doran prosecutors and judges and the Salvadoran police's lack of
investigative skills forced the program to include training on
police investigative techniques. The decision to include investiga-
tive training of foreign police was extended to the administration
of justice program, based on the view that police are an integral
element of any criminal justice process. 5
However, implementation of the program had to contend with
Congress's reluctance to fund foreign police:
U.S. officials developing the administration of justice pro-
gram drew a line between assistance to police to improve
investigative skills and assistance for operational matters
such as crowd control or arrest methods. Maintaining this
line was perceived as a way of avoiding the more controver-
sial areas of police assistance, thereby improving the
chance of getting past Congress's long-standing opposition
to police aid. State and Justice Department officials [were
able to obtain] authorization for "programs to enhance
Concepts in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 549, 549-
93 (1988).
63. CAROTHERS, supra note 53, at 212.
64. 3 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., supra note 56, at 12, 13.
65. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, UNDERWRITING INJUSTICE:
AID AND EL SALVADOR'S JUDIcIAL REFORM PROGRAM 36-70 (1989).
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investigative capabilities, conducted under judicial or
prosecutorial control." . . . The phrase "under judicial or
prosecutorial control" was compromise language intended
to limit U.S. aid to foreign police operating within the rule
of law .... [In fact, t]he administration interpreted the
phrase loosely and in practice police aid was given to any
country with an elected government, even if, as in Guate-
mala and El Salvador, the police's adherence to the rule of
law was very partial at best.66
After its authorization, the International Criminal Investiga-
tive Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was quickly estab-
lished. The Department of Justice had responsibility for the
program because it had more expertise in police matters and
because AID eschewed the program. AID did not want to repeat
any adverse experiences due to its association with the Public
Safety Program in the late 1960s and early 1970s and therefore
avoided becoming involved in funding police training. 7
ICITAP quickly arranged short training courses for police
officers in Central America and the Caribbean, which included
tutorials in:
[B]asic investigative skills, such as crime scene search, col-
lection and preservation of evidence, fingerprinting, and
interviewing. ICITAP also included judges and prosecutors
in some of its courses to increase their knowledge of investi-
gative methods[, as well as] understanding and communi-
cation between the police and the judicial sector. In
addition to these training courses, ICITAP also sponsored a
series of regional conferences for the police commissioners
of Central America and the Caribbean at which the com-
missioners discussed with ICITAP trainers and with each
other issues of police management, police standards and
accreditation, coordination of law enforcement efforts, and
sharing of facilities. These conferences were related to
ICITAP's longer-term goal of... modernizing and profes-
sionalizing police forces in Latin America and the
Caribbean.6"
During the 1980s, the U.S. Government operated other police
training programs in Latin America.
The State Department's global Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program provided operational training to several Central
66. CAROTHEaS, supra note 53, at 213-14.
67. Id. at 214.
68. Id. at 214-15.
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American police forces. The Defense Department furnished
military equipment and military-related training to the
Salvadoran police during the [years when its civil war was
at its peak]. The Drug Enforcement Agency trained a num-
ber of Latin American police forces in drug enforcement
methods. These other training programs differed from
ICITAP,... [concentrating] on the operational side of police
work.69
In contrast to Huggins' view of the goals and effects of U.S. police
assistance,
ICITAP viewed its larger mission as helping Latin Ameri-
can police separate themselves from the military forces and
guiding them toward a more "modern" conception of the
role of police in a democratic society. ICITAP was the only
police training program that was explicitly part of the
democracy assistance programs; the other programs implic-
itly accepted the police they dealt with as subdivisions of
the militaries and simply tried to make them stronger and
more effective in their operational capabilities.7 °
As Carothers has noted, the problems with the AOJ strategy
focused toward law enforcement institutions and toward govern-
mental institutions generally are very similar to those of the gen-
eral policy of promoting democracy by transition in Central
America.' The assistance does not address the overwhelmingly
anti-democratic underlying political and economic structures of
the societies." The AOJ programs target modifying institutional
forms that are often of peripheral importance in real terms. The
training also tends to overemphasize U.S. policy on the elite
groups in power and not to include the segments of society that
have long been disenfranchised and must be included in a par-
ticipatory political process if democracy is to succeed.73 The AOJ
did not address the essential arrangement of power issue in El
Salvador.74
Political violence from the right was due to the long-
standing existence of a whole sector of Salvadoran society
that held almost all of the military, political, and economic
power of the country, that was opposed to any change in its
69. Id. at 215.
70. Id.
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privileged position, and that was willing to use violence to
stop such change. The law enforcement system failed to
bring to justice the perpetrators of the high-profile political
murder cases (or any of the more pedestrian political
murders) primarily because it was either a captive of that
sector or even an active part of it .... The massive political
violence that occurred in the civil war merely underscored
the justice system's longstanding inadequacy . . . .The
notion then that the political violence from the right could
be controlled by technical improvements in the justice sys-
tem rather than by breaking up the Salvadoran's right's
traditional position of power was fundamentally flawed.
And the El Salvador Judicial Reform Project, which incor-
porated that notion, predictably failed to help the Salvado-
ran government bring to justice any perpetrators of right-
wing political violence. By the end of the 1980s not a single
high-level Salvadoran military officer had yet been con-
victed in any of the thousands of cases of right-wing vio-
lence. After the judicial reform program had been
operating several years and this failure became evident,
State Department officials began backing away from the
program's original justification, arguing that technical
improvements in the justice system would at least help
clarify where the real roots of the problem of bringing to
justice perpetrators of right-wing political violence lay, by
giving police the capability of developing cases and identify-
ing suspects even if the cases did not ever lead to
conviction.75
The United States must aid those countries with widespread
criminal problems that are working to change their legal systems.
Many countries are striving to modify their legal structures so as
to make them more honest, reliable, and trustable. U.S. AOJ pro-
grams provide important training, technical assistance, and inter-
nal surveillance methods for use on police forces. 6
However, the current U.S foreign aid program to the Western
Hemisphere concentrates on police and especially counter-narcot-
ics programs. The focus ignores and in some ways exacerbates the
root problems. Even from a criminal justice perspective, the over-
emphasis on narcotics is misplaced, especially because it ignores
and complicates the limited capacities of the justice and legal sys-
75. Id. at 224-26.
76. James R. Jones, Western Hemisphere, in PREPARING AMERICA'S FOREIGN




tems to absorb aid in one subsector of justice - narcotics - at the
expense of other criminal and legal issues.77
III. NATIONAL, BILATERAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
Many of the key policy and strategic decisions behind interna-
tional enforcement in the Americas and U.S.-Mexico are based on
national, bilateral and regional security issues. Hence, this sec-
tion considers trends in development of these issues.
The conclusion of the Cold War resulted in a worldwide reas-
sessment of tactical and security interests.78 "Alliances and rival-
ries" resulting from approximately forty years of a "bipolar
system" are suddenly being scrutinized. For example, the United
States and Mexico often put forth different (and even incompati-
ble) "interpretations of their national interests to the formulation
of national security policies."79 Each government adopts strate-
gies and rules that can (and often does) become a source of conflict
with the other, due in large part to the fact that they are often
made without considering the other country's possible construal of
its own national interests."
During the Cold War, U.S. national security policies were
guided by "anticommunism and containment, along with the pro-
motion of democracy and market economies . *.". ."' The United
States devoted substantial resources to articulating these views
and supporting strategies in domestic and foreign policy.82 Mexico
viewed potential U.S. domination as its only significant state-
based security threat."
However, the Mexican government avoided public dialogue
regarding its national security doctrine because of its concern that
such action might result in the imposition by the United States of
its own security priorities on Mexico. 4 "Historically, U.S. security
77. For a discussion of the shifting of U.S. policies and resources from narcotics to
transnational crime, see Raphael Perl, United States Foreign Narcopolicy: Shifting
Focus to International Crime, 1 TRANSNAT'L ORGANIZED CRIME 33-46 (Spring 1995).
78. John Bailey & Sergio Aguayo Quezada, Strategy and Security in U.S. -Mexican
Relations, in STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN U.S.-MEXIcAN RELATIONS BEYOND THE COLD
WAR 1, 1 (John Bailey & Sergio Aguayo Quezado eds., 1996).
79. Id. at 1-2.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. David R. Mares, Strategic Interests in the U.S.-Mexican Relationship, in
STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN U.S.-MEXIcAN RELATIONS BEYOND THE COLD WAR, supra
note 78, at 23.
84. Herndndez, supra note 57, at 31-33.
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policy toward Latin America has tended to stress military defense
against conventional external aggression and the neutralization of
domestic leftist movements perceived as threats to the internal
stability of friendly governments."85  Mexico has proactively
resisted any U.S. effort to promote such security policy interven-
tion in countries in the hemisphere, which Mexico sees as an
attempt to garner support of the U.S. security agenda in the
region - for example, with respect to Central America in the
1980s. 6 The government of Mexico similarly opposed the invasion
of Panama to arrest its head of state Manual Noriega for narcotics
offenses.8 7
As a result of recent global and regional developments, both
governments have reconsidered national security and the bilateral
security agenda. 8 Since the late 1980s, the government of Mexi-
can has addressed national security matters more openly and in
more detail than it had done before. 9 Its identification of new
security threats (such as drug trafficking) has converged with U.S.
national security policy and resulted in an increasing number of
joint U.S.-Mexican security interests.9 ° The United States has
also modified its national security perceptions and applications
due to new threats, which include transnational organized crime,
terrorism, regional conflicts, failed states, and increased influxes
of flows of refugees.9'
Three recent trends [drive the bilateral U.S.-Mexico secur-
ity relationship.] First, the bilateral relationship has
become even more extensive and intensive... , reinforced
by closer economic and social integration and technological
innovation in travel and communications. Second, both
societies are experiencing increasing rates of crime and
social distress[, such as structural poverty and unemploy-
ment, homelessness and personal insecurity, especially in
Mexico]. Third, the United States seeks to impose its own
legal concepts and policy preferences on other countries
generally and on Mexico specifically.92
85. Id. at 32.
86. Id. at 31-33.
87. Luis Herrera-Lasso, Mexico in the Sphere of Hemispheric Security, in
STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN U.S.-MEXIcAN RELATIONs BEYOND THE COLD WAR, supra
note 78, at 53.
88. Bailey & Quezada, supra note 78, at 2.
89. Id.
90. Id.




There may be some "natural convergence" of thinking about
strategy and security between the U.S. and Mexico. 3
Nevertheless,
The bilateral redefinition of strategic and security interests
will likely produce new tensions and conflicts, as well as
new opportunities for cooperation. Possible future points of
bilateral tension include: heightened control, even militari-
zation, of the border region arising from antidrug and anti-
immigration policy; "interventionist" methods of promoting
democracy and defense of human rights . . . ; military
involvement in the antidrug struggle... ; and Mexican per-
ceptions of a persistent U.S. tendency toward
unilateralism. 4
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and its
invasion of Iraq and the refusal by Mexico to support such strat-
egy, especially in the United Nations, have been sources of
tension.
To avoid and/or minimize costly bilateral tensions, Mares rec-
ommends that the United States and Mexico "should resist the
temptation to define [or exaggerate] nonmilitary core interests as
security interests."95 Where they perceive real military threats to
national security, they should eschew unilateral extraterritorial
measures.
96
The role of the Mexican armed forces and the bilateral Mexi-
can-U.S. military cooperation is likely to be important. In con-
trast to other countries in the hemisphere, the "pattern of
institutional civil-military relations" has facilitated the continua-
tion of a "demilitarized political system."97 The stability of Mex-
ico's system has been due mainly to the "effective functioning,
until recently, of its institutions for political control, mediation,
and cohesion (that is, the hegemonic party [PRI], corporatism, and
presidentialism), with use of repression as a last resort."" How-
ever, the Mexican political system's "traditional mediatory mecha-
nisms, uncertainty regarding the ruling party's political future,
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. Mares, supra note 8383, at 19.
96. See id.
97. Guadalupe Gonzdlez Gonzdlez, Challenges of Unfinished Modernization:
Stability, Democracy, and National Security in Mexico, in STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN
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ruptures within the political elite, and rising prospects for conflict
and organized violence (political, common, and guerrilla)" may
affect the Mexican army's political role as stabilizing institution
and test its true level of professionalism.99
From the early 1980s on, security challenges have increased
quite steadily in all aspects within Mexico. Intermittent out-
breaks of violence and bloodshed have unfortunately become more
and more common.' 0 Mexican land has increasingly been used as
a transit point for both illegal drug and weapons trafficking. 0 1 All
of this, in addition to the fact that Mexican law enforcement agen-
cies, such as the customs service, have become increasingly cor-
rupt and incompetent, has resulted in increased civil reliance on
the Mexican army for help with many aspects of governance, such
as election monitoring and maintaining peace in violent regions of
Mexico. 102
The Mexican army's increased involvement in preserving
public order and engaging in traditional law enforcement activi-
ties, such as counter-narcotics, has not yet led to openly repressive
actions. 3 However, sharp domestic criticism of the army's
increased activities and its lack of professionalism "has under-
mined the prestige of military commanders."0 4 The army's capac-
ity to carry out both military and law enforcement activities
within Mexico has been limited by inadequate "resources, intelli-
gence gathering, and technical capacity."10 5
There remains much room for improvement for mutual coop-
eration between Mexico and its partners in the region, including
the United States. As one commentator observed:
The U.S.-Mexican military relationship remains essentially
frozen in its late Cold War configuration, in spite of
profound changes in global affairs.... Although extensive
interaction does take place between law enforcement per-
sonnel engaged in counter-drug activities, the Joint Mexi-
can-U.S. Defense Commission remains moribund. At
present, the bilateral security relationship is largely infor-
mal, episodic, lacking in institutionalization, susceptible to










encumbered by obsolete stereotypes. This is especially true
of the military dimension of the relationship, but dealings
with the Foreign Ministry are not fundamentally
different.1"6
One potential mechanism through which to establish and
develop national security cooperation is the North America Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA does not explicitly deal with
security matters. 107 Still, NAFTA has significant implications for
regional security cooperation. Indeed, throughout the negotiations
and ratification of NAFTA, national security interests figured
prominently.
An important reason for the "NAFTA partners to establish a
mechanism to coordinate their actions in the field of national
security will be to manage the inevitably disruptive consequences
of economic and political change in Mexico."108 Over time, a more
typical pattern of military relations might be established, possibly
involving more and longer "personnel exchanges, common train-
ing, combined exercises, and coordinated planning." 9 In all like-
lihood, the emphasis of such relationships would be on such
shared security concerns as fighting terrorism, hastening disaster
relief, controlling illegal weapons and drug smuggling, supporting
law enforcement efforts against organized criminal institutions,
alleviating human trafficking, and regulating other perceived
transnational threats."0
The agenda must also be on anti-corruption, including adher-
ence to global and regional anti-national and transnational cor-
ruption regimes, and accountability in national and international
enforcement matters."'
IV. REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND CONFIDENCE
BUILDING MEASURES
In the post-Cold War period, confusion and lacking confidence
have marked strategic relations between states in the Western
Hemisphere.' During the Cold War, the heavy influence of the
106. Michael J. Dziedzic, Mexico and U.S. Grand Strategy: The Geo-strategic
Linchpin to Security and Prosperity, in STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN U.S.-MEXICAN
RELATIONS BEYOND THE COLD WAR, supra note 78, at 63, 68-69.
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United States characterized what was and was not considered a
threat for most Latin American countries."3 More recently, how-
ever, the United States, as well as Latin America, has seemingly
become increasingly uncertain in its quest to identify threats to its
national security and how best to respond to them."14 During the
last decade or so, considerable modification to the security agenda
of the Americas has occurred.'15 Countries and international orga-
nizations have begun considering "transnational, non-state-spon-
sored threats such as drug trafficking, international crime, and
migration.""6 As a result, diplomatic relations continue to exhibit
signs of distrust and skepticism, which hamper cooperation, and
"latent tensions over past conflicts threaten ... to destabilize the
region as a whole."" 7
Current exigencies impel hemispheric cooperation:
Throughout the Americas, countries face security threats
.... The preoccupation of many military and security offi-
cials has shifted from the traditional threats of military
invasion or border conflicts to that of more ambiguous and
multinational dangers such as armed drug cartels, terror-
ism, environmental destruction, and political crises. [The
new security priorities now involve] the vulnerability of
certain countries to threats generated by transnational
organizations, or the inability of a country to maintain sov-
ereign control over its entire national territory and
resources. The threats are expanded and made more insid-
ious by increasing international factors such as rapid
advances in communication technologies and the globaliza-
tion of economic systems, both legal and illegal. Since
these threats are nonstate in nature and usually involve
and affect many countries at once, individual nations[,
especially in the Caribbean and Central America,] do not
have the capacity or resources to address them effectively.
The new regional security agenda, therefore, requires
international cooperation."'
Conclusion, in STRATEGIC BALANCE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE
AMERICAS, supra note 46, at 172, 172. For background on the tumultuous Cold War
era conflagrations in the region, especially Central America, see generally CENTRAL
AMERICA: ANATOMY OF CONFLICT (Robert S. Leiken ed., 1984).





118. STRATEGIC BALANCE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE AMERICAS,
supra note 46, at 1-2.
444
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The more fluid hemispheric situation is unique. Latin Ameri-
can countries can delineate and develop security agendas with
"relatively little interference" from countries of other regions." 9
The U.S. security agenda is still, in large part, rather undefined.
The current Bush administration's focus appears to be placed else-
where. 20 Partially due to this, the United States seems to be more
receptive than ever to multinational initiatives emerging from
Latin America. 12' Therefore, Latin American countries may be
able to exert significant influence on the emerging international
security system, both in its design and its actions. These coun-
tries must reconsider their definitions of security so as to include
issues and concerns that they had previously overlooked as rela-
tively unimportant, such as certain environmental threats,
human rights violations, transnational crime, lack of disaster
relief, political instability, and other such dangers.'22 Conse-
quently, Latin American countries should define a collective
security agenda that addresses region-wide interests to promote
that agenda. 12 3
Looking ahead to the near future, scholars have expressed
optimism with regard to the potential for continued cooperation.124
The exigencies of globalization require increased confidence
among nations, especially regionally.'25 During the post-Cold War
era, there has been a relative accord among Latin American coun-
tries concerning the prioritization of democratic governance.'26
The shared commitment to democratic ideals has allowed for the
potential of closer international and regional cooperation and
exchange.'27
In addition, free trade and economic integration have
emerged both "[alt the hemispheric level, [with] the ambitious
Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative launched at the Miami
Summit in 1994" and at "the subregional level, [with]
MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Caribbean Common Market
and Community [CARICOM]," as well as the recent establishment
of the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Area (CATFA)."2 '
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These developments have not evolved without giving rise to
some concern. "Greater integration in commercial and political
affairs has not, however, translated automatically into improved
cooperation in matters of security. Closer, more dense interstate
relations tend to improve stability, but they also bring more fre-
quent episodes of conflict."129 Newly considered security concerns
include both "traditional areas of conflict - such as border demar-
cation and military buildup - and newly evolving threats" -
such as terrorism, international drug trafficking, human traffick-
ing, arms smuggling, and criminal networks. 3 ° All of these obvi-
ously pose great threats to security in the region. Differing
composition of threats, combined with resource limitations, espe-
cially in the smaller and economically challenged countries,
results in different security priorities among subregions. 3' "This
variety of threats and the changing nature of the international
environment within which they must be addressed necessitate
new mechanisms of conflict resolution." 3
2
The expansion of the regional security agenda to include eco-
nomic, social, and environmental concerns, and the increasing
diversity of the actors it involves, from state (e.g., Brazil)- or local-
level governments to multinational corporations, non-government
organizations (e.g., Amnesty International and the International
Association of Chiefs of Police), 33 and lending institutions, and
even families and individuals (e.g., the Rodriguez Orejuela broth-
ers of the Cali cartel 34 and Jesus and Luis Contreras of the
Colima cartel in Mexico),'35 complicate the creation of cooperative
initiatives. The concept of security becomes increasingly ambigu-
ous. The institutions charged with its preservation have difficulty
defining their goals and operations, especially when trying to
address security at the hemispheric level.
Recent administrations, including Clinton and Bush, have





133. For the growing role of philanthropic organizations in the Americas, see
Symposium, Philanthropy in the Americas: New Directions and Partnerships (Bruce
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appeared to pay attention to Latin America as a region [mainly] in
terms of trade or economic relations - [a type of] NAFTA-ization of
inter-American relations. " "' Exceptions occurred with respect to
"the crises in dealing with the military dictatorship in Haiti, or
the pressure the pressure brought to bear by the Cuban-American
Foundation to tighten sanctions on Fidel Castro." '137 In other
words, issues of U.S. domestic politics drove Inter-American policy
during the Clinton Administration. "[A] reemergence in U.S. pol-
icy of a Wilsonian urge to [undertake] good works on behalf of
democratic capitalism and to teach other nations how to behave
and how to enjoy the benefits of the American way of life
[occurred].13 Another element of influence in U.S. foreign policy
counterbalancing the Wilsonian trend was the Vietnam syndrome,
whereby the U.S. tried to avoid international adventures (e.g.,
peacekeeping except for Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti).139 In 1994, the
election of the Republic Congress and its "Contract with America"
showed a trend to emphasize a domestic agenda at the expense of
foreign policy.140
Reluctance on the part of the United States to become
involved, coupled with a lack of governmental or public focus on
Latin America, resulted in a tendency toward unilateral action in
hemispheric affairs. This reluctance also manifested itself in bilat-
eral dealings with other nations in the hemisphere, despite the
fact that the Clinton Administration started with all sorts of
encouragement for multilateral peacekeeping.
A unique effect of globalization that complicated the relations
of hemispheric countries with the U.S. was the increasing and
widespread importance of technology.
In assessing power in the information age, the importance
of technology, education, and institutional flexibility has
risen.... The convergence of key technologies, such as dig-
itization, computers, telephones, televisions, and precise
global positioning [will be vital] .... The United States
[has started to] adjust its defense and foreign policy strat-
egy to reflect its growing comparative advantage in infor-
136. Joseph S. Tulchin, The United States and Latin America in the World Today,
in THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 139, 141 (Joseph S. Tulchin
& Bernice Romero eds., 1995).
137. Id. at 141-42.
138. Id. at 142.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 141-142.
2006] 447
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3
mation resources.' 4 '
"The United States [and many developed countries] insisted
on making access to technology and the protection of intellectual
property rights one of the central issues of international trade
negotiations."4  Traditionally, countries in the hemisphere did
not prioritize these matters4 3 and even opposed giving dispropor-
tionate protection and concessions to technology exporters from
the metropole. Countries in the region were notorious for their
failure to crack down on copyright violations.1" "Further, coun-
tries in the hemisphere outside North America had never been
highly successful in the creation of technology. The key to growth
in the 1990s and beyond appeared to be the ability to attract tech-
nology, to attract qualified people [i.e. 'know how'], and to attract
capital."'45
The United States has focused its information technology on
transnational crime threats, such as terrorism, narcotics traffick-
ing, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional
environmental issues. 46 The United States is also trying to facili-
tate better inter-agency cooperation through information technol-
ogy on international enforcement.'47 Clearly, the United States
will increasingly use information technology "to project military
[and police] power for limited purposes and at a low cost in mate-
riel and lives."'48 Examples include the extension of economic
sanctions to narcotics traffickers to require U.S. financial institu-
tions to stop doing business with, and freeze the assets of, spe-
cially designated narcotics traffickers, as well as the listing of
countries that do not comply with international counter-drug
standards.
The effect of modern criminal activity has had a complex
effect upon Hemispheric relations.' 9 Such activity constitutes a
141. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & William A. Owens, America's Information Edge, 75
FOREIGN AFF. 20, 22-23 (1996); see generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD: THE
CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER (Basic Books, Inc. 1990).
142. Tulchin, supra note 136, at 145.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 145-46.
146. Nye & Owens, supra note 141, at 32.
147. Id. at 33.
148. Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 37, 53 (1996).
149. See generally CLAWSON & LEE III, supra note 134, at 131-238 (discussing, inter
alia, the rise in tensions between nations); Maria Celia Toro, Unilateralism and
Bilateralism, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAs 314-28 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1982);
Donald J. Mabry, The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN
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real threat to the national security of nations in the Western
Hemisphere and creates tense international relations.5 ° For
example, narcotics trafficking and the associated rise of powerful
organized crime organizations have "undermined the national sov-
ereignty of Colombia and embarrasse[d] both Peru and Bolivia on
account of their lack of capacity to control their national territo-
ries."'51 Similarly, narcotics trafficking, the rise of organized
crime groups and their use of corruption have periodically
poisoned the sovereignty and political stability of a number of
small countries, such as the Bahamas, Panama, and St. Kitts and
Nevis."'
In conjunction with this drug trafficking issue is the pressing
problem of determining how to stop it. The use of military means
to "end production, or reduce traffic, complicated bilateral rela-
tions between the United States and a number of countries in the
region and created considerable tension between nations of the
Amazon basin. The kidnapping of a Mexican national on Mexican
soil by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency embarrassed
Mexico."153
The Salinas government went to great lengths in an attempt
to contain illegal narcotics trafficking.1 54 These efforts, though,
actually became an obstacle for President Salinas in his endeavor
to successfully prioritize the government's free market policies
and the NAFTA, which the Bush administration did not antici-
pate.155 Similarly, in the United States, members of Congress
raised unsuccessfully drug trafficking and other enforcement
issues (i.e. problems extraditing persons from Mexico) and the
potential that free trade would exacerbate the problem as reasons
to oppose NAFTA. 56
"Other global issues that can produce tensions between the
United States and Latin America are the defense of human rights,
the protection of democracy, the proliferation and export of arms
THE AMERICAS 43, 43-60 (Bruce M. Bagley & William 0 Walker, III eds., 1995); Bruce
Michael Bagley, After San Antonio, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at
61-76; Jorge Chabat, Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations: What You See Is
What You Get, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 373-94; William 0.
Walker, After Camarena, in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 385-422.
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of mass destruction, migration, and population control." 1 7 To
achieve success for the region in dealing with these issues will
require the development of institutional mechanisms. 1 8 Each
nation must concede some of their sovereignty in order to allow
international organizations to deal with these issues.159
There has been a struggle to conceptualize the proper role of
the United States (and especially) its military as an element of the
total response to particular issues of hemispheric concern. The
United States government, in agreement with Latin American
countries, initially opposed the use U.S. troops to combat the pro-
duction and shipment of illegal drugs to the United States from
Latin America. 10 However, increasingly in the Clinton and Bush
Administrations, the U.S. military has participated in identifying
and stopping planes carrying drugs, training and supporting
Latin American military, and furnishing equipment for spaying
and destroying drug crops.
Further complicating U.S. policy in Latin America since the
mid-1980s "has been a... resurgence of Wilsoniansim." 11 In par-
ticular, the United States has made it a priority to preach the ben-
efits of and spread liberal democracy throughout the world, even
by force if necessary. 162 Examples of such following the Cold War
era are partisan American support of elite groups and the military
in Guatemala and Honduras and numerous international alli-
ances whose goals were to spread democracy and international
human rights. 63 However, during the George W. Bush adminis-
tration the support of a coup attempt against the Chavez adminis-
tration, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and its detention and
interrogation policies in the war against terrorism have under-
mined and complicated U.S. leadership on human rights, democ-
racy, and the rule of law.
With the transition to democracy well advanced in the
region, the human rights community consciously set out to
reinvent itself and to define its new mission now that the
United States was apparently not going to engage in clan-
destine interventions in the hemisphere or in operations




160. Id. at 151.
161. Id. at 152.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 152-153.
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violated the human rights of their citizens. Organizations
such as the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA),
Human Rights Watch, [Amnesty International, Human
Rights First,] and various church-related human rights
groups sought ways to remain effective in helping the
forces of democracy in the hemisphere consolidate their
strength and extend more widely into the populations of
Latin American countries.'
For instance, human rights organizations have brought a series of
cases against former high-level military and law enforcement offi-
cials of Central American governments who now live in the United
States for alleged crimes against humanity, such as torture, and
other atrocities. Some of these cases have resulted in verdicts
against the defendants. Transnational nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) have helped to establish like-minded organiza-
tions in Latin America, and have thus influenced both U.S. and
Latin American policy.1 65
Such groups continue to influence U.S. policies to combat vio-
lations of international human rights in the region, support genu-
ine democratic initiatives, and limit U.S. law enforcement policies
in the region that violate international human rights laws. 66
They also helped lobby multilateral organizations such as the
U.N., the OAS, and the EU to positively influence and support
international human rights and democratic initiatives.'67
Historically, the United States has wanted to deal with Latin
American countries on an individual basis and has discouraged
joint or multilateral efforts. 168 Today, the U.S. needs the hemi-
spheric countries, European and extraregional allies, including
international organizations, to help effectively combat drug traf-
fic, terrorism, and other transnational crime. 69
However, since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has returned to some of its traditional approaches in dealing with
Latin American countries. 7 ° Though it is not necessarily a pre-
meditated policy, the U.S. approach reflects concurrent attitudes,
164. Id.
165. Id. at 154.
166. See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, CHANGING COURSE: BLUEPRINT FOR
PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1984); ASPEN INSTITUTE OF
HUMANISTIC STUDIES, REBUILDING COOPERATION IN THE AMERICAS: 1986 REPORT OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE (1986).
167. See Tulchin, supra note 136, at 154.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 159.
170. Id.
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such as "an aversion to interference by outsiders, a compulsion to
prevent any instability that threatens the United States, and a
desire to preserve U.S. autonomy of action so that its global inter-
ests are not compromised."'71 This outlook indicates a hemi-
spheric hegemon "whose major preoccupations were elsewhere, a
hegemon that preferred not to get involved if at all possible, and a
hegemon that would like to reserve the region as a kind of pre-
serve, a safety area that might be redefined as an economic bloc if
that proved necessary."1 72 This U.S. policy has primarily been con-
cerned with countries and issues closest to its own territory, par-
ticularly those that most likely present any sort of threat.173 An
example of this can be seen in the fact that Mexico receives more
attention than Brazil. 74 Another example is the emphasis since
September 11, 2001, on the third border initiative, which priori-
tizes national security and counter-terrorism policies.
Relative inattention provides a "historically unique opportu-
nity to create a role in international affairs."'75 As a result of the
U.S. preoccupation with Europe, Latin American countries have
continuously exercised considerable autonomy in defining their
roles in world affairs.176 The United States may in fact be more
than willing to give up leadership to a democratic Latin America
as an equitable solution to such problems as drug control, trans-
national corruption, transnational terrorism, smuggling of arms
or aliens (especially women and children), recovery and return of
stolen airplanes and automobiles, and other international enforce-
ment issues. 177 "The U.S. military has indicated that it is willing
to collaborate with Latin American partners in its expanding 'non-
traditional' mission in the hemisphere."'78 Moreover, U.S. uncer-
tainty over its role in world affairs, coupled with a lack of
consensus on the value of multilateral organizations and their
ability to enforce the international code of behavior and resolve
conflicts, should result in even greater autonomy.
179
An important issue will be whether the nations of the hemi-
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terms that take advantage of, or require some measure of,
regional cooperation or integration. In the short term, in may
prove easier for countries in the hemisphere to operate in ad hoc
groups in which the common interest is clear - e.g., the Esquipu-
las group, the Group of Rio, or the Group of Three - rather than in
the OAS itself, which is hampered by its comprehensive member-
ship, its historical baggage, and its institutional clumsiness. Per-
haps the most important country is Canada, due to its size,
resources, commitment to both international enforcement cooper-
ation and human rights, and its dynamic role in new initiatives in
international enforcement cooperation (e.g., the landmine treaty
and the proposed Permanent International Criminal Court). By
defining their own positions with respect to the merging global
agenda, countries in the hemisphere can accommodate or combine
their respective positions with those of the United States.8 °
One way to overcome the confusion caused by the new
regional security threats (and the various agendas to combat
such) is to focus on action at the operational level.' In daily oper-
ations, law enforcement officials throughout the hemisphere are
constrained by their inability to coordinate and share information
and resources with colleagues across borders or on the open
seas. ' 2 "For this reason, confidence building measures at the
operational level, aimed at specific objectives and confined to indi-
vidual institutions or functionally related groups, can be particu-
larly helpful in establishing institutional networks upon which
future cooperative projects can be built.""8 3 As a "short term" solu-
tion, "small-scale initiatives . . . require fewer resources - an
important consideration in a period of fiscal downsizing and budg-
etary constraints - and are less controversial politically."8 4
Examples of such small-scale international law enforcement coop-
eration initiatives include the transnational exchanging of infor-
mation on tax crimes, alien and drug smuggling, and joint
maritime operations against smuggling (both of people and of
narcotics). 181
180. Id. at 165.
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V. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
Globalization and economic integration will make multilater-
alization of international enforcement in the Americas inevitable.
Multilateral approaches are already on the increase, though
mainly on an ad hoc issue basis. This section discusses the tradi-
tional and current role of the Organization of American States,
the principal international organization for providing support to
international enforcement issues.
A. Historical and Current Roles
Historically, the OAS has provided advisory legal services and
convened meetings and projects to prepare conventions for inter-
national criminal cooperation and harmonization of criminal
law. 186 The Inter-American Juridical Committee (IAJC) has
undertaken much of the advisory legal work. It serves the OAS as
an advisory body on juridical matters, helps promote the progres-
sive development and codification of international law, and stud-
ies juridical problems related to the integration of the developing
countries of the Hemisphere. 87 The IAJC undertakes studies and
any work that higher organs assign it. On its own initiative, it
can undertake any study it considers advisable and hold special-
ized juridical conferences. The Committee has eleven members,
who the General Assembly elects for terms of four years from
panels of three candidates presented by the member states.8 To
facilitate an equitable geographical representation, no two mem-
bers of the committee can be from the same state. 89
After the revised Charter of the OAS came into force in 1970,
several new modifications were introduced in the organization,
updating its structure and providing for new mechanisms with
important implications for international enforcement cooperation.
A new link of the General Assembly was Created with a new insti-
tution in 1979: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 90 In
1986, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
186. See About the OAS, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/aboutoas.asp (last visited July 31, 2006).
187. See Inter-American Juridical Committee, http://www.oas.orglcji/eng/inter-
americanjuridicalcommittee.htm (last visited July 31, 2006).
188. See Inter-American Juridical Committee: Members, http://www.oas.org/cjil
eng/membersliajc.htm (last visited July 31, 2006).
189. Id.
190. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/general
_ing/index.html (last visited July 31, 2006).
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(CICAD) was created. 91 The Inter-American Defense Board
(IADB) was upgraded and became directly linked to the General
Assembly.'19
B. Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
The OAS has exerted great effort in its attempt to promote
counter-drug control in the Western Hemisphere. In 1984, the
OAS General Assembly adopted Resolution 699, declaring illicit
drug trafficking a crime that affects all humanity, and convened a
Specialized Conference on Drug Trafficking. 9 In April 1986, the
conference took place in Rio de Janeiro.14 At the conference, the
Program of Rio was adopted.
95
The Program of Rio sets forth national and regional inter-
American measures with the objective of attacking both the
demand for and the supply of illegal drugs, through programs that
include education, treatment and rehabilitation elements.196 "It
calls for unified national drug control agencies to plan, implement
and coordinate comprehensive national policies and programs,
and the creation of CICAD at the inter-American regional level." 97
The Program highlights the necessity to synchronize "legislation
among member states, authorize the forfeiture of assets derived
from illicit drug trafficking, control precursors and other chemi-
cals essential for the manufacture of narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances, support crop substitution and eradication of
illicit production, and build effective cooperation among anti-drug
agencies in and among member states."'98
In 1990, the meeting of ministers at Ixtapa, Mexico, reaf-
191. See CICAD: Mission Statement, http://www.cicad.oas.org/EN/AboutCICAD.
asp (last visited July 31, 2006).
192. See Inter-American Defense Board: Overview, http://www.jid.org/en/about/
(last visited July 31, 2006).
193. See History of CICAD, http://www.cicad.oas.orgen/Main/AboutCICAD/history.
htm (last visited July 31, 2006).
194. For background to the efforts that led to convening the conference, see
generally Michael J. Dziedzic, The Organization of American States and Drug Control
in the Americas, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON DRUG CONTROL 397-400 (Scott B.
MacDonald & Bruce Zagaris eds., 1992).
195. For the latest revised text of the Program, see OAS, INTER-AMERICAN PROGRAM
OF ACTION OF RIO DE JANEIRO AGAINST THE ILLICIT USE AND PRODUCTION OF NARCOTIC
DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES (July 1992), http://www.cicad.oas.org(EN/
basicdocuments/Rio.asp.
196. Irving Tragen, World-Wide and Regonal Anti-Drug Programs, in DRUGS AND
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firmed the goals and content of the Program of Rio, which deter-
mined priorities for the inter-American Program in the 1990s. 199
They included early ratification by the OAS members of the 1998
U.N.Convention Against Illicit Traffic. °° CICAD was directed to
help member states harmonize "their laws and procedures for
effective application of the Convention, especially to control pre-
cursors and other chemical products and to effect forfeiture of
assets derived from drug trafficking and money laundering."20 1
Additionally, the ministers approved measures on inter-American
"cooperation on demand reduction, interdiction and elimination of
illicit production, as well as cooperation among the judiciary and
enforcement agencies."2 2
CICAD has developed five courses of action to execute the Rio
and Ixtapa Programs: "legal development, education for preven-
tion, community mobilization, a uniform inter-American statisti-
cal system and an inter-American drug information system."20 3 In
addition, in March 1990, CICAD approved the Model Regulations
to Control Chemical Precursors and Chemical Substances,
Machines and Materials to implement the provisions of Articles 12
and 13 of the 1988 U.N.Convention." 4 Most of the OAS countries
have now adopted and are applying the Model Regulations. 5
Also, in March 1992, the OAS adopted model anti-money launder-
ing regulations.2°6
CICAD has assisted OAS members "in promoting cooperation
among their judiciaries as well as in improving their enforcement
capability, especially in the collection, safekeeping and represen-
tation in judicial proceedings of evidence against those engaged in
illicit drug trafficking.... "207 OAS is cooperating in its efforts with
the UNDCP and ILANUD. °' In addition, the government of
Canada provides police training through the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police.209
CICAD's operations complement UNDCP efforts in helping
member states apply the Conventions and the U.N.comprehensive
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counter-drug policy. Clearly, the OAS has served as a medium to
enable the region to debate and develop a counter-drug policy.
However, severe funding limitations have limited CICAD in real-
izing many of its goals.2 10 The OAS has helped its members over-
come issues of sovereignty, autonomy, and national identity to
construct a multilateral counter-drug program. It still remains to
be determined whether the OAS members will allow it to build on
CICAD's experience, competence, and growing reputation and
play a more central part in the counter-drug campaign.211
C. Codification of International Law
In the last two decades, the IAJC has elaborated a variety of
legal instruments, many of which deal with international criminal
and enforcement law cooperation, such as: the draft Convention
on Extradition, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights
[Pact of San Jos6 de Costa Rica](1973); draft Convention That
Defines Torture as an International Crime (1980); draft Addi-
tional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
[Pact of San Jos6 de Costa Rica], and Inter-American Convention
to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985); New American Treaty of
Pacific Settlement and draft of the Inter-American Convention on
Judicial Assistance on Criminal Matters (1986); Additional Proto-
col to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty (1987); Draft Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons; the Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against
Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Signifi-
cance (1971).212 Other important international criminal coopera-
tion conventions include the Inter-American Convention on
Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, the Inter-American Conven-
tion on Terrorism, and the Inter-American Convention on
Corruption.
D. Inter-American Human Rights System
"The Inter-American human rights system has two distinct
legal sources: one has evolved from the Charter of the OAS,
[while] the other is based on the American Convention on Human
210. See Dziedzic, supra note 194, at 404-13.
211. Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Organization of American States and Control of
Dangerous Drugs, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 305, 311 (Peter H. Smith ed.,
1992).
212. 0. CARLOS STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 243-44 (1993).
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Rights."21 3 The Charter-based system applies to all thirty-five
OAS members, while the Convention system legally binds only the
States Parties.214 The two systems overlap and interact in diverse
ways. 21
5
In 1960, the OAS established the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) to promote human rights in its mem-
ber states.216 In 1965, the IACHR became a permanent branch of
the OAS. 2 17  Ever since then, the JACHR's jurisdiction has
extended beyond those states that were parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights, which went into effect in 1978.218
Regarding international criminal and enforcement law, the
importance of the IACHR is that it must devote special attention
to many of the rights dealing with criminal law and procedure.
The rights and protections are contained in both the American
Convention and the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, which is part of the 1948 OAS Charter.219 The
IACHR binds countries, such as the United States, that have not
ratified the American Convention. 20  The basic rights in the
American Convention and Declaration include the right to life, the
right of equality before the law, freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, the right to a fair trial, the right of freedom from arbitrary
arrest, and the right to due process of law.221 OAS members must
adhere to the American Declaration.
The IACHR is composed of seven members, nominated by
governments and selected by the Permanent Council of the OAS
as individual citizens.222 The IACHR meets for no more than eight
weeks per year on a part-time basis. 23 "Members are elected for
213. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 222
(2002). For a collection of relevant treaties and related texts, reports, judicial
opinions and historical documents on the OAS system, see HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1993). For
the basic texts, see OAS, Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System (May 21, 2001), http://www.cidh.oas.orgBasicos/basic.htm.
214. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 213, at 222.
215. Id.
216. Bryce Wood, Human Rights in Latin America, in GOVERNANCE IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 263 (Viron P. Vaky ed., 1983).
217. For related background information, see id.
218. Id. at 264.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. For a review of the integration between international human rights and
criminal law and procedure, see HURST HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE (1989).




four-year terms and may be reelected." 224 The commission has a
rather small staff.2
25
The IACHR investigates complaints of violations of human
rights made by individuals, national and international private
associations, such as Amnesty International and government
members of the OAS.228 The IACHR may use a complaint as the
basis of both a request for information from a government and a
proposal or recommendation to a government. 27 Thus, the Com-
mission serves as an official mediatory body between individuals
and their own governments.2 In addition, the IACHR may base a
request to a government to allow IACHR member representatives
to investigate a particular issue on a complaint.2 29 The Commis-
sion has also sponsored conferences and published numerous
human rights documents and pamphlets.230
The IACHR examines situations where individual complaints
or other credible evidence - such as reports from human rights
organizations - suggest that a government is engaging in large-
scale human rights violations such as inhumane prison condi-
tions.231 The IACHR provides a forum where redress would not be
afforded by normal procedures requiring the exhaustion of local
remedies (e.g., the IACHR visit to Argentina in 1980). The Com-
mission has visited countries, at their request, to assist in the pro-
tection of human rights in wartime (e.g., the Dominican Republic
in 1965,232 and Honduras and El Salvador in 1969233). On-site
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 265.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 264-65.
230. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 213, at 233; see generally IACHR, 25 YEARS OF
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 1959-1984 (1984); INTER-AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SEMINAR FOR CARIBBEAN JUDICIAL OFFICERS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION (PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 1993 BARBADOS SEMINAR) (1995).
231. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 213, at 234.
232. See generally IACHR, Report On the Activities of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Republic (June 1 to August 31, 1965),
in THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1960-67, at 359
(1972); IACHR, Report on the Activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on its Activities in the Dominican Republic, in THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1960-67, at 439 (1972).
233. Wood, supra note 216, at 265; see also BUERGENTHAL, supra note 213, at 234;
IACHR, Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Situation
Regarding Human Rights in El Savador and Honduras, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1969-1970, at 291 (1976).
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investigations are usually carried out by a "Special Commission"
of the Commission. 4
The Commission receives and acts on individual petitions
charging a violation of any of the rights enumerated in the Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man.2 35 The petition process
applicable to states not parties to the Convention concludes with a
"final report."236 If a state does not comply with the Commission's
recommendation, the Commission may publish the decision.237
The Commission's annual report to the OAS General Assembly
usually contains a chapter in which these decisions are repro-
duced. 3 ' The petition system has two fundamental flaws . 9 First,
"since the petitions are directed against states which are not par-
ties to the Convention, the Court has no contentious jurisdiction to
deal with them."24 ° Second, "although the Commission transmits
its decisions ... to the General Assembly," the latter does not deal
with individual petitions, thereby allowing states to continue to
violate the provisions of the system and depriving the system of its
effectiveness.24' Hence, the Commission, as opposed to the Court,
has no authority to ensure that a state complies with its recom-
mendations.242 Its most important role has been documenting the
human rights abuses that NGOs allege have occurred.243
The IACHR makes five types of reports: (1) a report of pro-
ceedings at each session; (2) comprehensive annual reports to the
OAS General Assembly; (3) special reports on the human rights
situation in individual countries; (4) special studies that are arti-
cles or essays by Commission members; and (5) Inter-American
Yearbooks on Human Rights.2"
The Convention authorizes the Commission to deal with indi-
234. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 213, at 237.
235. OAS, AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, arts. 51-54, available at httpi
/www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic3.htm (last visited March 23, 2006); OAS, Form For
Filing Petitions Alleging Human Rights Violations, https://www.cidh.oas.org/
cidh-apps/instructions.asp?gc-language=E (last visited March 25, 2006).
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244. Wood, supra note 216, at 266.
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vidual petitions and inter-state communications. 245 Accession to
the Convention is deemed acceptance of the Commission's juris-
diction to examine private complaints lodged against that state.246
The Commission can deal with inter-state complaints, those
brought by one State Party against another, only if both states, in
addition to ratifying the Convention have recognized the inter-
state jurisdiction of the Commission.247 In addition to the victims
of violations, any person or group of persons and certain nongov-
ernmental organizations can file a petition.248
The admissibility of a petition is conditional on, among other
things, (1) the exhaustion of domestic remedies "in accordance
with [the] generally recognized principles of international law,"
and (2) the requirement that the petition be submitted to the
Commission within a period of six months from the date on which
the victim of the alleged violation was notified of the final domes-
tic judgment in his case.249
In handling complaints that are admissible, the Commission
examines the allegations, seeks information from the government
concerned and investigates the facts.250 It may hold hearings in
which the government and the petitioners participate. 2 1 The
Commission also puts itself "at the disposal of the parties con-
cerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter
on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized" in the
Convention.252
If the parties do not reach a friendly settlement, the Commis-
sion issues a report with facts, conclusions, and applicable recom-
mendations, and transmits the report to the states concerned. 53
The latter have three months to comply with or react to the recom-
mendations of the Commission.254 During that period, the case
may also be referred to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights by the Commission or the interested states. Once the case
has been referred to the Court, it can render a judgment that is
245. OAS, AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, arts. 44 - 45, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.orgBasicos/basic3.htm.
246. Id. art. 44.
247. Id. art. 45.
248. Id. art. 44.
249. Id. art. 46.
250. Id. art. 48(d).
251. Id. art. 48(e).
252. Id. art. 48(f).
253. Id. art. 50.
254. Id. art. 51.
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"final and not subject to appeal."255 The Court may award mone-
tary damages"' and render declaratory judgments, and even issue
temporary restraining orders.257
Despite some successes to adjudicate individual complaints
involving abuses in criminal justice,258 the mediating influence of
on-site visits, and the education by the Commission's reports of
the need for enhanced compliance with international human
rights norms, there is still a large amount of impunity.259 More
can be done to enhance compliance with the Americas' interna-
tional human rights.
E. Future Roles
"The Reagan and Bush years hardened the U.S. position
toward all international organizations in general, and the OAS in
particular."260 Several actions undermined U.S.-Latin American
relations, including the use of mercenaries in Nicaragua to
destabilize that country's government, numerous U.S. interven-
tions in other parts of Central America, U.S. approval and support
of the British reoccupation of the Malvinas (the Falklands), and
finally, the invasions of Grenada and Panama in defiance of what
some see as the most elementary notions of international law and
morality.261
In response to these reactionary policies, the OAS provided
new elaboration on its non-intervention theory.2 62 Latin Ameri-
cans also established alternatives to the OAS by forming other
organizations.263 In some cases, OAS was merely bypassed.2 In
the 1980s, the Contadora Group (Colombia, Venezuela, Panama,
255. Id. art. 67.
256. Id. art. 68(2).
257. Id. art. 63(2).
258. In the VelAsquez-Rodriguez Case, the Commission and then the Court found
in favor of a victim of an unresolved disappearance case. See Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v.
Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. c) No. 4 (July 29, 1988), available at http:fl
www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf ing/seriec_04_ing.pdf. The principal findings of the
Velisquez-Rodriguez Court were reaffirmed in the Godinez Cruz case. See Godinez
Cruz v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. c) No. 5 (Jan. 20, 1989), available at http:/!
www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf ing/seriec_05_ing.pdf.
259. Diane F. Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment
and Victim Compensation, in HuMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
425, 440-48, 459-61 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).







and Mexico) and the Contadora Support Group (Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, and Uruguay) were established, both of which strove to
achieve a just and lasting peace in Latin America.2 65 These groups
were separate from the OAS and ultimately failed as viable alter-
natives.266 However, along with Canada's recent decision to join
the OAS, there has been great hope for the revitalization of both
the inter-American system and the OAS.267
In the 1980s the financial status of the OAS forced it "to make
drastic reductions with tremendous decreases in personnel and
their corresponding activities. 68 In addition, the Reagan admin-
istration and its negative position toward all international organi-
zations and especially the OAS triggered the forced additional
budgetary constraints.269
Today signs reflect an improved environment: "ideology, stat-
ism, protectionism, and social adventurism of doubtful repute are
giving way, under the impact of realism, to more positive solu-
tions."270 The OAS will likely profit from these fundamental
changes.271 If the United States takes the OAS more serious, as it
is likely to do, Latin Americans will almost certainly react in a
positive fashion.272
Three elements have "undermined efforts to make the OAS a
significant medium for the resolution of hemispheric conflicts."273
First and foremost is the strong propensity of the United States to
act unilaterally in order to avoid being constrained by other states
or organizations, a tendency that ias been reinforced by Republi-
can control of Congress.274 Second, Mexico, as well as many other
countries in the hemisphere, has been reluctant to cede its
national sovereignty to an international organization that the
United States controls. 275 Finally, in the 1990s, the end of the
rigid, zero-sum, bipolar framework for national security debates
stimulated neonationalist postures in Latin America, just as it did




268. Id. at 298.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 300.
271. Id.
272. Id.





464 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3
During the first Bush administration, the United States
started to successfully engage the OAS to resolve hemispheric
problems.277 This success was due in part to the efforts of Luigi
Einaudi, a U.S. civil servant and an esteemed Latin American
supporter, who became U.S. ambassador to the OAS and provided
dynamic leadership. 8 However, "[t]he agenda of hemispheric
conflict resolution" was incredibly complex and far-reaching, and
encompassed such broad issues as "democracy, governance, emi-
gration, civil-military relations, the environment, drug traffic, and
poverty. 2 79 Such complexity prompted relatively "low[I levels of
consensus among the membership. 28 °
The decision of both Bush administrations and the Clinton
administration not to take a leadership role for the United States
in the OAS were due partly to a "long-standing reluctance to allow
the organization to compromise U.S. independence of action, and
in part to a widespread disdain within the policy-making bureau-
cracy for the institutional capacity of the OAS." 28' At the same
time, the decision also resulted from the genuine confusion of the
government regarding U.S. foreign policy.28 2 Confusion reigned on
strategic issues and uncertainty over what constitutes a threat.283
The United States will continue to play a pivotal role in the
OAS. 2' The more the United States "respects its neighbors and
discontinues its 'cowboy politics,' the better it will be for U.S.-
Latin American relations in general, and for the OAS in particu-
lar."285 As Latin America becomes a more significant region in the
world, the United States will likely alter its agenda and develop
appropriate priorities.26 The United States is expected to eventu-
ally normalize relations with Cuba, and will likely "avoid military
expeditions or covert operations in the name of all kinds of alleged
threats and cures."2 7
While states can act on collective interests without institu-
tions or formal organizations, institutionalization can strengthen
collaboration that is more sustainable and dependable than under
277. Id. at 149.
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ad hoc measures, with a view towards consistent cooperation and
collaboration.288 Organizations can also improve cooperation by
disseminating information that would normally be unavailable or
difficult for individual governments to obtain.289 The use of orga-
nizations can diminish "duplication and offer economies of scale,
resulting in lower costs for providing infrastructure, monitoring,
and staffing in comparison with ad hoc functional
arrangements."29 °
"International organizations, ad hoc collective ventures, and
bilateral relations are not mutually exclusive spheres."29' States
use different channels and strategies depending on their inter-
ests.292 However, the fundamental dilemma of multilateralism
embedded in the heart of collective rules and norms in a world
still composed of sovereign states has never been completely
resolved.293 In general, states have come to terms with this prob-
lem more easily when cooperative action goals are distinct, techni-
cal, and clearly defined.294
The United States has debated its role and purpose in the
world and its foreign policy strategies.295 Some Americans reject
multilateralism because it obstructs "the pursuit of national inter-
ests" and freedom of action, and hinders the "exercise of real
power."296 While such arguments were more convincing during
the Cold War struggle, they are not realistic in today's world.297
As a result of changing circumstances, the first Bush administra-
tion, in spite of some exceptions (like the invasion of Panama),
deviated from Reagan era unilateralism and adopted cooperative
approaches and problem solving strategies.298 The Clinton admin-
istration also occasionally utilized a multilateral strategy, but the
general bias towards unilateral and bilateral resolutions to global
and regional issues continued. 29  For instance, the Clinton admin-
288. Viron P. Vaky, The Organization of American States and Multilateralism in
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istration refrained from comprehensive regional initiatives in the
Americas and even exercised caution on ad hoc initiatives in
counter-drug issues where it prioritized unilateral and bilateral
initiatives. Similarly, the United States has not joined a number
of international initiatives, including the landmine treaty, the
United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child,300 the
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Seizure and Forfei-
ture of Assets, and the Rome Convention on the Permanent Inter-
national Criminal Court.30 ' The George W. Bush administration
amplified the unilateral emphasis of U.S. foreign policy, as exem-
plified by its support of preemption, its invasion of Iraq despite its
inability to secure Security Council authorization, and its hostility
toward the ICC.
An important related diplomatic issue is how to reduce the
hostility between globalism and regionalism. 2 The role and pur-
pose of regional entities like the OAS depends in part on the use of
other potential institutions, such as the U.N. or the use of ad hoc
bilateral measures. "With the removal of the restraints imposed
by the cold war's global geopolitical framework, regional organiza-
tions and regimes have become more active and more important,
discovering that many of the problems of today's world are best
dealt with in a regional context.13 3 Regional and even subregional
organizations can effectively carry out tasks because they often
have a better understanding of the way problems present them-
selves locally and can be solved. 4
The U.S. propensity for both covert and overt interference to
meet what it believed to be security and ideological threats to the
region led to a progressive estrangement in U.S.-Latin American
relations. During a time when nonintervention in a country's
internal affairs was accorded the status of a near-sacred principle
in the region, these actions could only produce suspicions of a U.S.
quest for hegemony. The alienation, together with the stagnation
and eventual demise of the Alliance for Progress during the Nixon
administration, caused the system to start to unwind.
300. See, e.g., Judith Miller & Paul Lewis, Fighting to Save Children from Battle,
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"Some elected governments in the region have ...become
very sensitive to IACHR criticism."305 They have even suggested
that the scope of the commission's activity be limited - "for exam-
ple, eliminating investigations and reports on individual cases of
torture and disappearance in favor of broader studies on generic
problems." 06 In 1998, Trinidad & Tobago withdrew from the
American Convention (and, in 1999, Peru attempted to withdraw),
partly due to the criticisms of their resumption and use of capital
punishment. °7
CICAD's achievements have been impressive, such as its
preparation of model regulations regarding control of chemical
precursors and money laundering.30 However, "[a]lthough sug-
gestions have been made from time to time that the OAS develop
an enforcement capacity" or an OAS drug force, these proposals
have not received real support, and have encountered some active
opposition among member governments.0 9 An additional compli-
cation concerns the region's difficulty in integrating economic and
social aspects into the defense-security-criminal law enforcement
agenda.
In June 1991, the OAS General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion that officially defined defense expenditures, acquisition and
proliferation of weapons, and confidence-building procedures as
justifiable regional security concerns. 10 The assembly set up a
security advisory group to make proposals and suggestions
regarding these areas.3 1' A year later, the OAS members
"approved an extensive statement of principles and goals entitled
'Cooperation for Security and Development in the Hemisphere -
Regional Contributions to Global Security,' representing in effect
a normative framework to guide member governments' activities
in these areas.""2 The OAS also formed the Special Committee on
Hemispheric Security to develop a security agenda.3
In May 1992, the OAS General Assembly asked the Perma-
nent Council to make recommendations "defining the 'legal-insti-
305. Id. at 20.
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tutional relationship' between the Inter-American Defense Board
(IADB) and the OAS." 1 4 The IADB's standing brings up broad
questions regarding civil-military relations and democracy. 15
There is concern that in this post-Cold War era, the IADB's
agenda is undefined.3 6 Until now, it has functioned as a separate
organization of hemisphere military forces that view the organiza-
tion as independent of the "political" organs of the OAS.3 17 "The
redefinition of the Defense Board's mission and status remains
controversial."3 8 While some members support "converting the
Defense Board into an advisory and supporting entity for the Per-
manent Council under its general supervision," others "propose
converting [the Board] into a specialized organization" like
PAHO. 319
The OAS's legal structure, its subsidiary policymaking infra-
structure, financial makeup, characteristic organization and
interaction with member states and the U.N.help determine the
range and efficiency of its efforts to create autonomous organs .20
The considerable disparity in power between the United
States and Latin American countries has been simultaneously the
greatest encouragement of and the greatest obstacle to successful
inter-American relations.321 Indeed, a majority of modern U.S.-
inter-American relations history "can be interpreted in terms of
the efforts of the United States to legitimate and exercise its
power in the region," and of the rest of the region to constrain and
cope with it.322
The countries in the western hemisphere have perceived the
safeguarding of their national independence, particularly vis-h-vis
the power of the United States, as a fundamental foreign policy
objective. 23 They have consistently tried to restrain the United
States through the use of international fora and juridical obliga-
tions and commitments. 24 Thus, it is no surprise that some Latin
American countries see the treaties and institutions of the OAS as
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a way to limit the United States. 25 However, a number of govern-
ments view the OAS as susceptible to U.S. control.326 Their fears
are "resuscitated by episodes such as the 1989 U.S. invasion of
Panama or the assertion of the right to enforce U.S. law extrater-
ritorially, as in the case of the Cuban Democracy Act... forbid-
ding foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals from trading with
Cuba." 27 In addition to the resentment generated by asymmetry,
cultural differences between the English-speaking Caribbean and
the Latin American countries have been exacerbated by clashing
views of OAS priorities.328
Following the 1969 creation of the Special Committee for
Latin American Coordination (CECLA), several nations have
made periodic attempts, particularly during the last decade, "to
coordinate their policies and positions ... to deal with the United
States (and industrialized countries generally), as well as to
advance their mutual interests."32 9
Independent, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
also proliferated and formed networks on issues including police
and law enforcement, human rights, trade unions and labor
rights, professional and business associations, women's rights,
religious freedoms, and environmentalism.33 ° Various law enforce-
ment NGOs, such as the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, have played an important role in helping establish "best
practices" standards, setting ethical and moral standards and
upgrading the overall professionalism of police and related law
enforcement officials. NGOs have made great contributions to
civil society in the western hemisphere. ' The OAS, NGOs, gov-
ernments, think tanks, and the policy community should all
explore "[tihe potential for constructive cooperation and coordina-
tion between the NGOs and the OAS and its specialized
agencies."332
In many issues, such as peacekeeping, international drug
trafficking, and terrorism, the roles of the U.N.and the OAS are
ambiguous, overlapping, complementary, and without proper
325. Id.
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funding.13 In some cases countries in the hemisphere are ambiva-
lent about the U.N.while others believe that it can help dilute the
dominance of the United States. 34
The financial position of the OAS is important. The OAS is in
the process of recovering from a severe economic crisis that nearly
bankrupted it in the 1980s. 3 1 The United States actually initiated
the crisis when it not only refused "to pay its full assessment on
time, allowing large arrearages to accumulate over the decade,
but also decided unilaterally to reduce its share (66%) of total
assessments."336 In 1990, the OAS approved a decrease in the U.S.
quota to 59.47% of total assessments 7.3 3  Following this move, the
United States restarted full payment of its new quota. 8 In addi-
tion, the United States started to make payments on a number of
its arrearages 39 Much of the work of the OAS in international
enforcement - such as CICAD, the IAHRC, corruption, and terror-
ism - is limited by the organization's precarious financial situa-
tion.34 ° The economic constraints and monetary limitations of
OAS members increase the difficult trade-offs.3 41 "The OAS finan-
cial situation is truly a test of member states' commitment to
regional governance."34 Their unwillingness or inability to sup-
port it precludes its effectiveness. 43
A case can be made that the best possibility for OAS expan-
sion is "incrementalism: small gains, modest shifts in attitude,
and cumulative processes" that slowly realize considerable
improvement.3 44 As nations in the region realize the need to work
with the OAS and begin to take advantage of the interlocking rela-
tionships that the OAS helps to establish, both their experience
and reassurance in the process will increase. 45
The fact that diverse specialized organizations provide special
services and aid in the region suggests that the OAS has not
decided whether or not it should engage in the implementation of
333. Id. at 35-39.
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programs as distinct from policy guidance, or whether to consoli-
date procedures under its direct control or disperse power to spe-
cialized entities. 346  Different bodies have taken different
approaches at different times . 47 A better use of OAS resources
would be a "'lynchpin' concept, that is, decentralizing operational
matters (such as technical assistance, narcotics, etc.) to its subsid-
iary agencies, commissions, or committees (such as CICAD, the
[IAHRC, PAHO]), while the central governing bodies concentrate
on overall policy control and coordination."3 8 Under this
approach, the councils and the secretary-general's office would
make up the management hub of a "flexible array of decentralized,
associated, and even independent organizations and cooperative
ventures." 349 This lynchpin function would comprise a very useful
method for member states to "ensure coordination among agen-
cies, including those with a global reach, involved in hemispheric
affairs," while minimizing the bureaucracy and financial cost.3 50 A
"lynchpin" concept can apply to hemispheric criminal justice pol-
icy and unilateral criminal cooperation.
In the final analysis, the future prospects of the OAS will be
shaped to a substantial degree by the United States. What con-
cerns the hemisphere are the intentions, style, and "hegemonic"
proclivities of U.S. involvement.351
VI. MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL
COOPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
During the last few years, governments in the western hemi-
sphere have begun to experiment with more comprehensive
approaches to criminal cooperation and administration of justice.
In particular, five meetings of the ministers of justice or attorneys
general in the region have occurred. In November 1999, the OAS
adopted a resolution establishing an inter-American justice study
center. In addition, under the auspices of the OAS, governments
are increasingly establishing working groups to deal with a series
of transnational crime and security issues, such as cyber crime,
terrorism, transnational corruption, and so forth.
These more comprehensive approaches to criminal coopera-
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tion and the administration of justice indicate the emergence of an
international criminal cooperation and enforcement regime in the
western hemisphere. Naturally, at the emergence of any interna-
tional regime, the normal obstacles of sovereignty concerns, dis-
trust of bureaucracies, uncertainty over the issues, trade-offs
between private sector roles and governmental roles, and compet-
ing power centers manifest themselves.
By selecting some of the criminal issue specific areas and
developing some analysis of their interrelationship with interna-
tional criminal cooperation, we can see the gaps and the tensions
that sometimes exist among governments and competing
interests.
A. Meetings of Ministers of Justice
Since 1997, the Organization of American States has con-
vened regular meetings of ministers of justice or attorneys general
in the Americas (hereinafter referred to as Ministers of Justice).
The meetings provide a forum for wide-ranging discussions on all
aspects of international enforcement cooperation and criminal jus-
tice in the region. The meetings presage more dynamic coopera-
tion among the governments of the region on criminal matters.
1. Background
The first meeting of ministers of justice convened in Buenos
Aires, Argentina in 1997 from December 1st through 3rd.5 2 This
meeting was held pursuant to a resolution of the foreign ministers
and heads of delegation of the OAS member states, meeting in
Lima, Peru at the twenty-seventh regular session of the General
Assembly.35 The purpose of this meeting was to consider ways by
which to improve legal and judicial cooperation in the Americas.3
At the first meeting of the Ministers of Justice, the following
conclusions were reached:
(1) The existence of a legal system that guarantees the
observance of human rights and duties, facilitates access to
justice, and offers protection to society[,] is an essential ele-
ment for consolidating the rule of law and for allowing
352. See OAS, Meeting of Ministers of Justice, Buenos Aires, Arg., Dec. 1-3, 1997,
Final Report of the Second Meeting of Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys
General of the Americas, OEA/Ser.KXXXIV.2 REMJA-II/doc.21/99 rev.1, available at
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social and economic development to proceed as an effective
formula for the integration of [the Americas].
(2) Strengthening the legal system requires the adoption of
standards that will preserve the independence of the judici-
ary, the continued improvement of its institutions' abilities
to enforce the rule of law, and the training and continuous
upgrading of magistrates, judges, prosecutors and public
attorneys, and other officials related to the justice system,
as well as lawyers.
(3) The threats facing... [society], such as organized crime,
corruption, drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering,
child exploitation, and the deteriorating natural environ-
ment, can only be successfully addressed by upgrading our
national systems of justice, and by strengthening interna-
tional cooperation in these areas, in all its forms.
(4) The valuable inter-American juridical inheritance
embodied in the many treaties prepared under the aegis of
the Organization of American States needs to be given,
effective application, through prompt ratification of the
conventions that have been signed, and adequate dissemi-
nation of their texts, and of the practice of member states.
(5) International legal cooperation is essential for the devel-
opment of justice systems ... [and requires the promotion
of] mutual legal assistance in a flexible and effective man-
ner, in particular with respect to extradition, requests for
delivery of documents and other forms of evidence, the
establishment of secure and prompt channels of communi-
cation such as those of Interpol, and strengthening of the
role of the Central Authorities.
(6) One of the major challenges facing our societies today is
to develop prison and penitentiary systems that offer suita-
ble conditions for rehabilitation and re-integration into
society for those who have been sentenced to imprisonment
by the courts. 55
The ministers of justice endorsed a series of recommendations
at the conclusion of their first meeting:
(1) To continue the process of strengthening the legal sys-
tems of the Americas, so as to ensure that individuals have
full access to justice, to guarantee the independence of the
judiciary and the effectiveness of prosecutors and public
355. Id. ch. I.I.A.
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attorneys, and to encourage the establishment of respon-
sive and transparent systems and modern institutions.
(2) To approach the process of modernizing justice from a
multidisciplinary viewpoint that goes beyond strictly legal
considerations, and embraces such aspects as organiza-
tional analysis, systems management, social costs and ben-
efits, and economic and statistical studies.
(3) To encourage the incorporation of alternative dispute
settlement procedures into national justice systems.
(4) To continue efforts to improve inter-American instru-
ments for legal cooperation, to which end every state
should evaluate the current application of existing mea-
sures, and take steps to disseminate them more broadly, as
well as to promote the establishment of other instruments
that may be necessary to deal with new contingencies. [In
this connection the General Secretariat of the OAS will I
prepare a study on the obstacles impeding the effective
application of treaties of legal and judicial cooperation....
(5) To promote the exchange of national experience and
technical cooperation in prison and penitentiary policy
matters, within the framework of the OAS.
(6) To promote the sharing of experience and technical
cooperation in matters related to criminal prosecution sys-
tems, access to justice, and judicial administration.
(7) To reinforce the fight against corruption, organized
crime and transnational criminal activity, and to adopt new
legislation, procedures, and mechanisms as necessary to
combat these scourges.
(8) To welcome the [then] forthcoming Summit of the Amer-
icas,... [in April 1998] and to express satisfaction that the
timely topic of strengthening the judicial system and the
administration of justice has been included on the agenda
for that occasion.
(9) To convene a meeting of government experts, with the
support of the OAS, ... [before the Summit of the Ameri-
cas], to examine basic issues in the Justice Sector, with a
view to incorporating their analysis into the work of the
Summit of the Americas.
(10) To encourage the holding of regular meetings of minis-
ters of justice . . . within the framework of the OAS and
with technical support from the Organization's General
Secretariat.
(11) To accept . . . [the Peruvian Government's offer] to
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
serve as host for the Second Meeting of Ministers of Justice
. . . [and] [tio request the OAS to provide the financial
resources necessary for carrying out the various recommen-
dations issuing from this First Meeting of Ministers of
Justice."6
2. Second Summit of the Americas
In April 1998, government experts met to incorporate basic
justice-sector issues into the agenda for the Second Summit of the
Americas, which was held later that month in Santiago, Chile. 7
The heads of state and government that met at this summit
adopted a Plan of Action, which contained the following decisions
concerning the "Strengthening of Justice Systems and
Judiciaries:"
Develop mechanisms that permit easy and timely access to
justice by all persons, with particular reference to persons
with low income, by adopting measures to enhance the
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the courts ....
Strengthen... systems of criminal justice founded on the
independence of the judiciary and the effectiveness of pub-
lic prosecutors and defense counsels, recognizing the spe-
cial importance of the introduction of oral proceedings in
those countries that consider it necessary to implement this
reform.
Step up efforts to combat organized crime, and transna-
tional crime, and, if necessary, foster new laws and interna-
tional conventions, as well as procedures and mechanisms
for continuing to combat these scourges.
Adapt legislation and proceed, as soon as possible, with
necessary institutional reforms and measures to guarantee
the comprehensive protection of the rights of children and
youths to meet the obligations established under the
United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child and
other international instruments.
Adopt, as appropriate a clear distinction between proce-
dures and consequences of violations of criminal law and
measures established to protect children and youths whose
rights are threatened or violated, and . . . promote social
and educational measures to rehabilitate young offenders.
Foster the establishment and strengthening of specialized
356. Id. ch. I.I.B.
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tribunals or courts for family matters, as appropriate, and
in accordance with their respective legal systems.
Expedite the establishment of a justice studies center of the
Americas, which will facilitate [the] training of justice sec-
tor personnel, the exchange of information and other forms
of technical cooperation in the Hemisphere ....
Promote, in accordance with the legislation of each country,
mutual legal and judicial assistance that is effective and
responsive, particularly with respect to extraditions,
requests for the delivery of documents and other eviden-
tiary materials, and other bilateral or multilateral
exchanges in this field, such as witness protection
arrangements.
Support the convening of periodic meetings of Ministers of
Justice and Attorneys General of the Hemisphere within
the framework of the Organization of American States
(OAS).3 58
3. General Assemblies of the OAS Adopts Justice
Initiatives
After each of REMJA meeting, the next OAS General Assem-
bly (GA) considers and approves the conclusions and recommenda-
tions reached. Subject to the availability of resources, the OAS
agrees to undertake many specific tasks. 39 For instance, after the
first REMJA meeting, the OAS GA agreed to establish a working
group to prepare a strategic plan; create an Inter-American Stud-
ies Center; evaluate international cooperation instruments; pro-
vide on-going support for meetings of Ministers of Justice;
exchange information regarding training in the judiciary; and
expand the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. 6 °
4. Second Meeting of Ministers of Justice
After careful preparation by the Permanent Council and the
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the OAS, the Sec-
ond Meeting of the Ministers of Justice was convened in Lima,
Peru on March 1-3, 1999.361 After six working sessions, the par-
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ticipants reached the conclusions and recommendations discussed
below.
a. Access to Justice
The "exchange of experiences regarding measures and initia-
tives adopted at the domestic level, as well as progress achieved
and obstacles encountered by the OAS member states in relation
to the problem of access to justice in the respective countries"
must be continued. 2 Legal and defense services must be
improved. 63 The legal protection of minors must be enhanced. 64
National justice systems must incorporate alternative dispute res-
olution methods. 65
To achieve these goals, applicable cooperation mechanisms in
these areas must be clearly identified.3 66 The following implemen-
tation actions were identified: "compilation of the legislation in
force regarding these matters, with a view to creating a database;
comparative studies; and preparation of a list of countries and
institutions that are in a position to provide international coopera-
tion in these areas."67
During that session, the OAS General Assembly also adopted
a resolution titled "Enhancement of the Administration of Justice
in the Americas," in which "it resolved, inter alia, to receive with
satisfaction the report of the Permanent Council on the enhance-
ment of the administration of justice in the Americas.
b. Training of Judges, Prosecutors, and Judicial
Officers
(1) Justice Studies Center for the Americas
In order to establish the Justice Studies Center envisioned in
the Plan of Action of the Second Summit of the Americas and con-
sidering the different legal systems in Hemisphere, it was decided
that the Center's objectives will be to facilitate "[tihe training of
justice sector personnel; [t]he exchange of information and other
forms of technical cooperation; [siupport for the reform and mod-
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"1369ernization of justice systems in the region.
To achieve the Center's goals a group of government experts
would be formed to "[p]repare draft by-laws; [pirepare a work
plan; [ildentify public and/or private institutions working in this
area; [and] [e]stablish appropriate links with international orga-
nizations in order to secure the necessary technical support for the
Center's operations."37 °
In the initial phase, the Center's work plan will focus on crim-
inal justice matters. 71 The OAS was requested to provide the nec-
essary support for the work of the group of experts.372 The Center
is actively carrying out its responsibilities under the Plan of
Action.
(2) Regional Courses, Workshops, and Seminars
The ministers of justice will continue to cooperate with the
OAS General Secretariat in "organizing regional or subregional
courses, workshops, and seminars to train and develop the legal
skills of officials in charge of the justice system in the OAS mem-
ber states in collaboration with international or national, govern-
mental or nongovernmental institutions.
c. Strengthening and Developing Inter-American
Cooperation
The ministers of justices and their delegates pledged "to
strengthen international cooperation, in the framework of the
OAS and other institutions, in areas of special concern, such as
the struggle against terrorism, combating corruption, money laun-
dering, drug trafficking, forgery, illicit trafficking in firearms,
organized crime, and transnational criminal activity."374
The meeting also recommended the establishment of an inter-
governmental expert group, within the framework of the OAS, on
cyber crime .3 7 This group would have a mandate to:
1. complete a diagnosis of criminal activity which targets
computers and information, or which uses computers as the
means of committing an offense;
369. Id. ch. III.IV.
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2. complete a diagnosis of national legislation, policies and
practices regarding such activity;
3. identify national and international entities with relevant
expertise; and
4. identify mechanisms of cooperation within the inter-
American system to combat cyber crime.7
The expert group would also present a report to the Third
Meeting of Ministers of Justice or Ministers or Attorneys General
of the Americas. 7
The ministers and their delegates also agreed "[t]o continue
working in an effective and flexible manner to strengthen mutual
legal and judicial assistance among the OAS member states,"
especially in areas having to do with "extradition, requests for
delivery of documents and other forms of evidence and the estab-
lishment of secure and prompt channels of communications
between central authorities."7 8
Moreover, ministers and their delegates agreed to "evaluate
the application of inter-American conventions in force in the area
of legal and judicial cooperation, in order to identify measures for
their effective implementation or, if appropriate, to determine
whether the existing legal framework in the hemisphere should be
changed."3
79
The OAS member states that are parties to treaties for legal
and judicial cooperation were urged to "appoint Central Authori-
ties where they have not yet done so, to ensure the effective imple-
mentation of these treaties."3"'
The meeting adopted a recommendation that the "OAS con-
vene a meeting of central authorities in due course to strengthen
cooperation among those authorities in relation to the various con-
ventions on the subject of legal and judicial cooperation." 381
The ministers agreed on measures on extradition, forfeiture of
assets, and mutual legal assistance.32 The Third Meeting of Min-
isters agreed to develop:
1. Extradition 'checklists,' glossaries of commonly-used
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. ch. IV.III.C.
379. Id. ch. IV.III.D.
380. Id. ch. IV.III.E.
381. Id. ch. IV.III.F.
382. See id. ch. IV.III.G.
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legal terms, and similar instruments of simplified guidance
and explanation on extradition and related processes;
2. Sample forms for intergovernmental requests for mutual
legal assistance; [and]
3. Instructional materials on the best methods for securing
bilateral and international assistance in the area of forfei-
ture of assets.3 3
To facilitate this, the ministers pledged to start compiling "a
list of contact points for information on extradition, mutual legal
assistance, and forfeiture of assets."3 4
d. Prison and Penitentiary Policy
The ministers and their delegates reemphasized "the need to
promote the exchange of national experience and technical cooper-
ation in prison and penitentiary policy matters within the frame-
work of the OAS."38 5
5. Analysis
The meetings of the ministers of justice represent an impor-
tant step in identifying the need for regular meetings of the minis-
ters of justice to consider on a comprehensive basis the whole
panoply of justice issues. These meetings, especially under the
auspices of the OAS, have enormous potential to facilitate and fos-
ter international cooperation and progress on a broad range of jus-
tice issues.
Two critical variables in the achievement of the lofty goals of
the meetings will be the ability of OAS members to allocate suffi-
cient resources to meet the multiple goals and the vision and polit-
ical dynamics of members to cede enough authority to the
framework mechanisms. Inevitably, conventions, model regula-
tions, and lofty rhetoric encounter the realities of national,
regional, and international politics, in which transnational crime
and international organizations play important roles. OAS mem-
bers will be challenged to transfer sufficient authority to the OAS
or related mechanisms to ensure that effective cooperation on law
enforcement and administration of justice takes root. Interna-
tional and regional regime dynamics involve law, policies, politics,
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. ch. IV.IV.
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and will have an ebb and flow of their own depending on external
variables.
Nongovernmental organizations often play an important role
in the development of international regimes. It is too early to
know the types of roles NGOs will play in the design, implementa-
tion, and evolution of criminal cooperation and administration of
justice regimes. To some extent, the OAS and its member states
can encourage and foster the involvement of NGOs in the process.
B. Establishment of Justice Study Centers
As part of the implementation on the "Strengthening of Jus-
tice Systems and Judiciaries" during the meeting of the heads of
state and government at the Second Summit of the Americas, held
in Santiago, Chile, in 1998, the Ministers of Justice or Ministers
or Attorneys General of the Americas have taken steps to estab-
lish "a Justice Studies Center for the Americas, which will facili-
tate the training of justice sector personnel, [and] the exchange of
information and other forms of technical cooperation in the Hemi-
sphere, in response to particular requirements of each country."386
An additional objective of the Center is to "facilitate support for
the reform and modernization of justice systems in the region. "387
Subsequent to the Santiago Summit, during the dialogue of
heads of delegation at the twenty-eight regular session of the OAS
General Assembly, discussion focused on the creation of an Inter-
American Studies Center. The OAS General Assembly resolved to
convene the Second Meeting of Ministers of Justice or Ministers or
Attorneys General of the Americas. On March 1-3, 1999, the Sec-
ond Meeting of the Ministers of Justice resolved to entrust the
OAS with the task of preparing a draft statute for the Center.
In April 1999, the OAS Permanent Council established a Spe-
cial Group to Implement the Recommendations of the Meetings of
Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys General of the
Americas (hereinafter "REMJAs"), instructing it to convene and
hold such meetings of government experts as may be necessary to
assist in the implementation of the recommendations made at the
above-mentioned Meetings of Ministers of Justice. 8
At their second meeting in Lima, Peru, the Ministers or Attor-
386. OAS, Meeting of Ministers of Justice, OEA/Ser.P AG/RES. 1 (XXVI-E/99) (Nov.
15, 1999), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/Justice/Justice-Center-
Statutes.htm.
387. Id. art. 3.
388. Id. art. 2.
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neys General of the Americas urged the OAS to provide support
for meetings of government experts with a view to: preparing a
draft statute for the Justice Studies Center for the Americas; pre-
paring a work plan for the Center, which would initially focus on
criminal law topics; identifying public and/or private institutions
working in this area; and establishing "appropriate links with
international organizations in order to secure the necessary tech-
nical support for the Center's operations.""9 With the Permanent
Council's consent, the Special Group on Justice held four meetings
of government experts between May and September 1999.
The Center will be an "intergovernmental entity with techni-
cal and operational autonomy, established by resolution of the
General Assembly of the [OAS]."39 The Center is governed by its
Statute and its Rules of Procedure. 91 Its activities will be exe-
cuted "in accordance with the policy guidance reflected in the con-
clusions and recommendations" of the Meetings of Ministers of
Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas. 92
The Center may also "take into account the pertinent mandates of
the Summits of the Americas and resolutions of the OAS General
Assembly."393
"All the member states of the OAS [will be] members of the
Center."394 Permanent observers to the OAS and any national or
international, governmental or nongovernmental, organization
may participate under the terms and conditions established in the
Rules of Procedure of the Center.393
The organizational structure of the Center will consist of: a
Board of Directors, composed of seven members elected in their
personal capacity by the OAS General Assembly;39 the Office of
the Executive Director, which will be the operational unit of the
Center; and such advisory groups as may be established by the
Board of Directors in order to attain the Center's objectives. 97
The Center's functions are, inter alia:
(a) To serve as a clearinghouse for the collection and distri-
389. OEA/Ser.K/XXXIV.2 REMJA-II/doc.21/99 rev.1, supra note 352, IV.II.A(2)(d).
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395. Id. art. 8.
396. Id. art. 9, 11.
397. Id. art. 9.
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bution of information on national experiences pertaining to
modernization and reforms of justice systems in the region;
(b) To carry out comparative analysis, research, and on jus-
tice issues studies, and facilitate their dissemination;
(c) To facilitate the dissemination of research and studies
relating to justice in the Americas;
(d) To facilitate the training of justice sector personnel and
the improvement of existing mechanisms for that purpose
in the countries of the Hemisphere;
(e) To facilitate dissemination of information on teaching
methods, model curricula, and training aids for personnel
involved in the justice system;
(f) To facilitate the dissemination of relevant information
on courses, seminars, fellowships and training programs;
and
(g) To support cooperation related to the different systems
of justice in the Hemisphere.39
The financing of the Center's activities comes partly from vol-
untary contributions provided by the OAS member states and
from funds from other public and private sources.3 99 The Board of
Directors can authorize the establishment of specific funds in
accordance with the General Standards to Govern the Operations
of the General Secretariat of the OAS.4 °°
The Statute creating the Center entered into force after the
OAS General Assembly adopted it.401 For its initial phase, the
Center will "develop topics related to criminal justice, seeking to
take advantage of the experience by other organizations in the
Hemisphere in this area."4°2 The Center's headquarters in Santi-
ago, Chile was selected at the Third Meeting of Ministers of Jus-
tice, based on the recommendations presented by the Board of
Directors regarding the proposes made by the member states.
The decision to establish the Center, along with the annual
meetings of the ministers of justice in the region, represents a step
towards additional enforcement cooperation in the region.
398. Id. art. 4.
399. Id. art. 17.
400. Id.
401. Id. art. 18.
402. Id. art 7.
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VII. WORK ON SINGLE CRIME ISSUES
At present the threats of transnational crime have compelled
Western Hemisphere governments to commission the OAS to
work on the problems on an issue-by-issue basis.
A. Transnational Terrorism4°3
1. Introduction
On June 7, 1996, at its Twenty-Sixth Regular Session in Pan-
ama, the General Assembly of the OAS adopted a resolution
approving the "Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to Pre-
vent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism. "404 Among other mea-
sures, it recommends that the OAS follow up the progress made in
implementing that Plan of Action and that the OAS General
Assembly consider convening a meeting of experts to examine
ways to improve the exchange of information among the member
states, in order to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism.4 5
The GA resolution also asks the OAS Permanent Council to
consider convening a meeting of government experts to examine
ways to improve the exchange of information and other measures
for cooperation among the member states to prevent, combat and
eliminate terrorism. The Inter-American Juridical Committee
was tasked to study the topic of inter-American cooperation to
confront terrorism, in light of the documents approved at the OAS
Specialized Conference held on that subject.
2. Background
The OAS Plan of Action built on other counter-terrorism
403. OAS, Second Plenary Session, Lima, Peru, April 26, 1996, Plan of Action on
Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, OEA/Ser.K/
XXXIII.1, CEITE/doc.8/96 rev. 3, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/
Docu7.htm [hereinafter Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation]. This section of
this paper is largely adopted from a paper the author prepared, entitled "The OAS'
Adoption of a Plan of Action on Hemispheric Antiterrorism Cooperation: Just a Fad or
Can It Lead to a New Counter-terrorism Paradigm?," delivered as a speech at the
Inter-American Defense College, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. on Sept. 24, 1996 at
the Symposium on International Terrorism and Organized Crime Security Concerns.
Bruce Zagaris, Editor-in-Chief, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., The OAS' Adoption of a
Plan of Action on Hemispheric Antiterrorism Cooperation: Just a Fad or Can It Lead
to a New Counter-terrorism Paradigm? (Sept. 24, 1996) (copy on file with author).
404. OAS, General Assembly Regular Session, AG/RES. 1404 (XXVI-O/96) (June 7,
1996).
405. See generally OAS, General Assembly Resolution, AG/RES. 1377 (XXVI-0/96)
(June 6, 1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/ga-res96/Res-1377.
htm.
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actions taken by the OAS. In December 1994, as part of the Dec-
laration of Principles of the Summit of the Americas, the govern-
ments condemned terrorism and pledged, using all legal means, to
combat terrorist acts anywhere in the Americas with unity and
vigor.4 " They decided to convene a special OAS conference on the
prevention of terrorism.4 7 In June 1995, the OAS General Assem-
bly convened an Inter-American Specialized Conference on Ter-
rorism,4°8 a positive step forward.
In December 1995, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, and Panama signed the Framework Treaty on
Democratic Security in Central America, whereby the parties
undertake to prevent and combat, without exception, all types of
criminal activity with a regional or international impact, such as
terrorism. 40
9
3. Plan of Action
The Plan of Action, adopted at the April 23-26, 1996 Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Terrorism, in Lima, Peru,
calls for a series of actions by governments to harmonize law and
strengthen international cooperation against terrorism.410
a. Harmonization of Law
With respect to harmonization of laws, governments must try
to "establish terrorist acts as serious common crimes or felonies
under their domestic laws, if they have not yet done So. "1411 Gov-
ernments must make "special efforts to adopt, in their territories
and in keeping with their domestic laws, measures to prevent the
provision of material or financial support for any kind of terrorist
activity."4 2 They must take measures to "prevent the production
of, trafficking in, and use of weapons, munitions, and explosive
materials for terrorist activities."41 3 They must adopt "measures
406. See OAS, Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism
(April 26, 1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Docu6.htm
[hereinafter DECLARATION OF LIMA].
407. For a summary of these provisions, see Summit of the Americas Calls for
International Enforcement Cooperation, 11 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 67, 69 (1995).
408. See Declaration of Lima, supra note 406.
409. See U.S. Dep't St., Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central
America (1995), http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/4368.htm (last visited July 31,
2006).
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to prevent the terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological
materials."414
Harmonization of law projects between countries with varied
legal systems, such as the civil and common law systems, and
with respect to new, dynamic and controversial subject areas,
such as international terrorism, take careful, painstaking, and dil-
igent patient work over many years. A centralized support mech-
anism in the nature of a secretariat must collect, digest and
catalogue laws, monitor terrorist trends, and collect and catalogue
legislative responses. The support mechanism must facilitate dis-
cussions of the different legislation, statistics, and provide for
training in drafting and implementation of these law.
b. Strengthening International Criminal Cooperation
against Terrorism
On strengthening international cooperation, the governments
must promote the prompt signing and ratification of and/or acces-
sion to international conventions related to terrorism, in accor-
dance with their domestic laws. They must periodically share
updated information on domestic laws and regulations adopted in
the area of terrorism and on the signing and ratification of and/or
accession to relevant international conventions (including the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970, the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971, and the 1963
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft).
In Western Europe the European Committee on Crime
Problems (within the Council of Europe) and the European Union
have worked to strengthen international cooperation and dis-
cussed narrowing the political offense extradition exception to
facilitate investigating and prosecuting international terrorism.415
c. Cooperation on Intelligence
OAS members must provide pertinent legal information and
414. Id.
415. For a discussion of a dated treatment of European counter-terrorism policy,
see Ekkehart Muller-Rappard, The European Response to International Terrorism, in
THE LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 385-
436 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
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other background data on terrorism to the OAS General Secreta-
riat, which must be kept organized and up-to-date.
At present, several international conventions obligate signa-
tory countries to collect and transmit data to prevent terrorism.
For instance, the United States' Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986 "directs the U.S. president to continue
to seek the establishment of an international committee, to be
known as the International Antiterrorism Committee."416 The
committee will focus attention and secure the cooperation of other
countries on international terrorism. 417
"State Parties to the various multilateral Conventions and
bilateral treaties must enact legislation and to implement govern-
mental procedures to carry out the requirements."418 Notification,
assistance, and cooperation in practice mean communications
about and transmission of data concerning terrorist activities.
"Assistance to States who prosecute offenders requires storing the
data until offenders are caught and then transmitting it to the
prosecuting State."419 The best storage and transmission methods
involve computer database files.42°
Due to the much wider range of threats and dangers from ter-
rorism and the heightened risks to global and national infrastruc-
ture, intelligence cooperation is needed to adequately forecast
dangers to democracy and economic well-being. Better coopera-
tion on intelligence is required partly because many of the threats
of today tend not to be identified with any particular nation state;
rather they are amorphous, spilling across national boundaries to
connect with ethnic or religious cohorts, shadowy terror groups, or
criminal organizations.421
At present, countries have exchange and liaison arrange-
ments for a significant portion of their intelligence. Some
arrangements are long-standing, highly formalized, and involve
the most sensitive forms of intelligence collection. Others are less
wide-ranging and reflect limited common interests between the
416. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
399, § 701, 100 Stat. 853, 877-78.
417. Id.
418. Ellen A. Yearwood, Data Bank Control, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 163, at 249, 256.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. See, e.g., IN FROM THE COLD: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 56-57 (Allan E. Goodman, Gregory
F. Treverton & Philip Zelikow eds., 1996).
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United States and particular nations. Hence, countries have
shared intelligence on various types of national security problems
such as terrorism and drug trafficking. Exchange arrangements
may involve different components of the intelligence communities.
For instance, some U.S. intelligence arrangements involve links
between the CIA and a nation's counterpart agency, whereas
others involve cooperation between the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence and one or more foreign naval intelligence organizations.
Intelligence exchanges have been especially valuable in
resolving terrorist incidents. For instance, the United States and
Israel have exchanged intelligence during crisis situations. In
1976, the United States furnished Israel with both aerial and sat-
ellite reconnaissance photographs of Entebbe airport to supple-
ment the information obtained by Israeli agents in preparation for
the Israeli hostage rescue mission.422 During the 1985 hijacking of
the Achille Lauro, Israel provided the United States with the loca-
tion of the ship on several occasions, the location of the ship's
hijackers when they were in Egypt, and the identification number
and call sign of the plane carrying the hijackers seconds after it
took off from Egypt.423 Another example was the extensive intelli-
gence exchange relationship between Japan and the United
States. The exchange of signals intelligence included Japanese
sharing of Soviet communications intercepted by a unit on Wak-
kania on the night the Soviets shot down Korean Air Lines Flight
007.424
Future increased cooperation on counter-terrorism intelli-
gence must take into account limitations imposed by constitu-
tional, international human rights, and national laws. Much can
be done to unify the methods, forms, and technologies for intelli-
gence collection, analysis, and transfer.
d. Mutual Assistance and Extradition
Governments in the hemisphere must promote measures for
mutual legal assistance and strict and timely compliance with
applicable extradition treaties or, if appropriate, must deliver
alleged perpetrators of terrorist acts to competent authorities for
prosecution, in accordance with domestic laws, if sufficient legal
grounds for doing so exist.
The Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance is now
422. Id. at 288.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 292.
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in effect. Additionally, some OAS members are bound by multilat-
eral conventions - including the Inter-American Convention on
Terrorism - to provide mutual assistance in the event of certain
crimes such as hijacking. Although some bilateral Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters Treaties (MLATs) exist, their coverage
only applies to a clear minority of the countries.425
Already a significant amount of extradition occurs for terror-
ist crimes. For instance, on June 3, 1996, the United States
announced the provisional arrest of Julian Salazar Calero, a
known member of the Peruvian organization Sendero Luminoso.42 6
The arrest occurred on May 31, 1996 under its extradition treaty
with Peru and the U.S. magistrate also denied a defense request
for bail.427
e. Sharing Operational Terrorist Information
Governments are to try, in keeping with domestic laws, to
exchange information concerning terrorist individuals, groups,
and activities. In this connection, when a state learns that suffi-
cient grounds exist to believe that a terrorist act is being planned,
it must provide pertinent information to potentially affected
states as soon as possible in order to prevent commission of that
act. Governments must try to promote and enhance bilateral,
subregional, and multilateral cooperation in police and intelli-
gence matters to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism.
While various international organizations such as Interpol
provide for cooperation against international terrorism, controver-
sies have historically caused major divisions among law enforce-
ment officials about the desirability of cooperation against
political crimes.42 Indeed, such controversy contributed to unsat-
isfactory relations between the United States and Interpol for
many years.4 9
Perhaps a model for regional storage and exchange of terror-
ism and terrorist information should be a counterpart to Europol,
if the hemisphere can ever develop such an organization. Growing
425. See, e.g., NADELMANN, supra note 32, at 313-96 (discussing the few MLATs
between the United States and other countries in the Americas).
426. U.S. Makes Provisional Arrest of Alleged Peruvian Terrorist, 12 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 292, 292 (1996).
427. Id.
428. See, e.g., NADELMANN, supra note 32, at 351-52 (discussing the inclusion of a
'political offense" exception in MLATs and extradition negotiations).
429. See, e.g., MICHAEL FOONER, INTERPOL ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 40-45 (1989).
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tension on ideological matters between the United States and,
inter alia, Cuba and Venezuela, is likely to inhibit the establish-
ment of a regional system.43 °
f Cooperation in Border Security, Transportation and
Travel Documents
Governments in the hemisphere must coordinate efforts and
examine measures to improve cooperation on border security,
transportation, and travel documents in order to prevent terrorist
acts. They must also promote the modernization of border control
and information systems to prevent the passage of persons
involved in terrorist acts as well as the transport of equipment,
arms, and other materials that could be used to commit such acts.
While the United States government has promoted some of these
policies in discussions and agreements with Mexico and Canada
and regionally in the third border initiative, the initiatives are
limited because they are in reality unilateral, unsupported by
legal and financial elements, and without institutional
measures. 431
g. Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Training
Governments must extend, when possible, cooperation and
technical assistance for the regular and advanced training of per-
sonnel entrusted with counter-terrorism activities and tech-
niques. 41' The training must be in accordance with minimum
international criminal justice standards and avoid advocacy of
executions, torture, blackmail, or other forms of illegal coercion
against alleged terrorists.433
h. Assistance to Victims
Governments need to assist the victims of terrorist acts and
430. For a discussion of the ideological tension between the United States on the
one hand and Cuba and Venezuela on the other and their application to regional
criminal politics, see Michael Shifter & Vinjay Jawahar, The Divided States of the
Americas, 105 CURRENT HISTORY 51 (2006).
431. See Dorith Grant-Wisdom, United States-Caribbean Relations: The Impact of
9/11, in CARIBBEAN SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERROR: CHALLENGE AND CHANGE 252,
264-68 ( Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith ed., 2004) (discussing the Bush administration's
conceptionalization of the third border initiative and counter-terrorism and the
enormous economic and other challenges for the Caribbean to meet U.S.
expectations).
432. Dana Priest, U.S. Instructed Latins on Executions, Torture; Manuals Used




cooperate among themselves to that end. Governments must hold
meetings and consultations to assist and cooperate in preventing,
combating, and eliminating terrorist activities in the Hemisphere
and, within the framework of the OAS, to follow up the progress
made in implementing the Plan of Action.
4. Post September 11, 2001
Since the terrorist incidents in the United States on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the OAS has become more proactively involved in
counter-terrorism enforcement. In 1999, the OAS established an
Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE). 434 On
June 3, 2003, the OAS General Assembly adopted and opened for
signature the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.
435
The Convention builds on the existing international instruments
and seeks to promote close cooperation among OAS Member
States in implementing the provisions of the Convention.436 In
particular, Articles 4-6 of the Convention have measures to pre-
vent, restrict and eliminate the financing of terrorism, including
requirements that signatory parties adopt a "comprehensive
domestic regulatory and supervisory regime" for all kinds of finan-
cial entities.437
5. Analysis
Clearly, the OAS initiatives, particularly the Plan of Action,
are preliminary steps and non-binding on governments. Without
hard law, such as the conclusion of treaties with binding commit-
ments by states, implementation and enforcement mechanisms
that require accountability, transparency, and provide the means
to impose sanctions on non-complying states, the undertakings in
the Plan of Action will be difficult to translate into hard law that
governments practice on a day-to-day basis.
Once governments start to discuss a treaty that has meaning-
ful implementation and enforcement mechanisms, various domes-
tic organizations, such as the gun and explosive lobbies, the
manufacturers of affected weapons, and civil liberties groups par-
ticipate and try to change, defer, or even block any new convention
434. See OAS, General Assembly, AG/RES.1650 (XXIX-O/99) (June 7, 1999).
435. See Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism: Do Such Instruments Contribute to the Effective Combat of Terrorism?, 19
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or meaningful implementation of the undertakings in the Plan of
Action.
In the meantime, the institutions and resources of the OAS
are woefully inadequate, especially as it assumes enormous new
potential roles in implementing counter-terrorism, corruption,
and anti-money laundering activities without any new infusion of
resources. Politicians can still beat their chests, blow their bugles
and rattle their drums about the need for increased measures for
counter-terrorism. Even if there are dissonant sounds, the
counter-terrorist music must start while we may still be able to
dance.
B. Cyber Crime438
On October 28, 1999, the Permanent Council of the Organiza-
tion of American States received and published the final report on
the meetings of government experts on cyber crime that contain a
series of recommendations on international enforcement and
efforts to harmonize the law on combating and preventing cyber
crime.439
1. Introduction and Background
In March 1999, the Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or
Attorneys General of the Americas, at its second meeting, recom-
mended the establishment of an intergovernmental experts group
on cyber crime to (1) complete a diagnosis of crime targeting com-
puters and information in the member states; (2) complete a diag-
nosis of national legislation, policies, and practices responsive to
such crime; (3) identify national and international entities with
relevant expertise; and (4) identify mechanisms of cooperation
within the inter-American system to combat cyber crime.
In May 1999, the First Meeting of Government Experts on
Cyber Crime met to accomplish the goals set by the ministers of
justice or attorneys general. The group of experts developed a sur-
438. This section appeared in 16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 734-736 (2000) and
has been reproduced here with the permission of the author, editor, and copyright
holder, Bruce Zagaris. All text and citations remain the same as in the original. Note
that the subheadings and footnote numbers have been changed to conform to the
format of this article.
439. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Special Group to
Implement the Recommendation of the Meetings of the Ministers of Justice or of the
Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas, Final Report on the Meetings of




vey requesting information from each member state about (1) its
experience with various types of cyber crime; (2) the substantive
laws governing cyber crime; (3) the jurisdiction and extradition
principles governing cyber crime; (4) the laws governing the pres-
ervation and gathering of evidence in such cases; and (5) the exis-
tence of specialized training programs or law enforcement entities
and/or experts to combat cyber crime.
On October 14-15, 1999, the Special Group on Justice later
held the Second Meeting of Government Experts on Cyber Crime.
The meeting was held to analyze the replies by the governments of
member states to the survey on this topic, to consider mechanisms
for cooperation on cyber crime within the inter-American system,
and to listen to papers from experts.
2. Diagnosis
For purposes of the diagnosis, "cyber crime" is defined as a
criminal activity in which information technology systems (includ-
ing, inter alia, telecommunications and computer systems) are the
corpus delicti or means of committing an offense.
At present cyber crime is perceived as rare, and often is not
specifically criminalized under the law. Some states punish
crimes committed using information technology when such acts
are in themselves offenses, such as, for instance, fraud, tax eva-
sion, defamation or distribution of child pornography.
A need exists to develop, adapt, and harmonize the legisla-
tion, procedures, and institutions required to combat the increas-
ing abuse and misuse of computers in member states.
In connection with legislation to gather evidence, the author-
ity to trace, collect, preserve, and disclose electronic communica-
tions traffic information and computer data is a prerequisite to
the investigation of cyber crimes. Since cyber crime is still incipi-
ent and difficult to detect, some member states may not have
encountered the unique problems associated with gathering evi-
dence for cyber crimes. In some cases investigators might not be
allowed to take other pertinent steps to investigate cyber crime,
such as obtaining source and destination information about com-
munications simultaneously with the transmission of those com-
munications, which may be necessary to trace a computer
intrusion.
The greatest difficulty member states encounter in combating
cyber crimes is the dearth of investigative and prosecutorial enti-
ties with the expertise to investigate or prosecute cyber crimes.
20061 493
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3
Training on cyber crime investigation is lacking. Agencies that
have not specialized in the field often investigate cyber crimes.
Very few member states have encountered difficulties related
to the global nature of cyber crimes or have made or received
requests for international assistance in cyber crime cases. Despite
the lack of requests so far, cyber crime is commonly traced
through computer networks located in a multitude of countries
unrelated to the location of the perpetrator or the victim. Hence,
the ability to request and to provide international assistance is
critical and merits further examination by states. Despite the per-
ceived lack of regional harm from cyber crime to date, indications
are that the cyber crime problem is escalating.
3. Identification of National and International Entities
with Relevant Experience
The group of experts identified the following entities with
expertise regarding cyber crime: the Council of Europe, the Group
of Eight, the European Union, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, and Interpol.
Various academic and private sector entities have critical exper-
tise, including telecommunications companies and "incident
response teams" such as the Computer Emergency Responses
Team at Carnegie-Mellon University in the U.S.
4. Identification of Mechanisms of Cooperation within the
Inter-American System
Existing arrangements can facilitate cooperation against
cyber crime, including bilateral and multilateral mutual legal
assistance treaties, Interpol, letters rogatory, and information
cooperation mechanisms. A few countries in the Americas have
joined or are in the process of joining the 24-Hour/7-Day a Week
Point of Contact Group.
5. Recommendations
The meeting of experts made the following recommendations
that will be presented during the Third Meeting of Ministers of
Justice or of Ministers of Attorneys General of the Americas: (1)
that states be urged to identify one or more agencies within their
country that will have primary authority and responsibility to
investigate and prosecute cyber crime; (2) that states still lacking
legislation cover cyber crime act to fill the gap; (3) that member
states be requested to harmonize their laws on cyber crime to
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facilitate international cooperation in preventing and combating
these illicit activities; (4) that member states determine their
training needs in the area of cyber crime and explore bilateral,
regional, and multilateral cooperation mechanisms to meet those
needs; (5) that an effort be made to prepare general guidelines to
be used in devising legislation covering cyber crimes; (6) that vari-
ous measures be considered, including establishing a Voluntary
Specific Fund, to support efforts to expand cooperation on this
matter in the Hemisphere; (7) that members be encouraged to
exchange information on cyber crime; (8) that support be rendered
to dissemination of information regarding OAS activities in this
field, including its Web page on the subject; (9) that states con-
sider the possibility of joining the 23-Hour/7-Day a Week Point of
Contact Group, or participating in other existing mechanisms for
cooperation or the exchange of information to initiate or receive
information; and (10) that member states act to increase aware-
ness of this issue among the general public, including users in the
education system, the legal system, and the justice system regard-
ing the need to prevent and combat cyber crime.
C. Transnational Corruption44 °
The principal mechanism in the Western Hemisphere to
develop an enforcement regime against transnational corruption
is the Inter-American Corruption Convention. Emerging from the
Organization of American State's Working Group on Probity and
Public Ethics, and connecting with civil society, the initiative
focuses on establishing a legal framework, namely a convention,
developing model laws, and forming an alliance with interested
international governmental organizations and NGOs.
1. Background
On April 7, 1996, twenty-one members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) signed the Inter-American Corruption
440. This section appeared in Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The
Emergence of an International Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in
the Americas, 30 LAW & POL'Y IN'L Bus. 53, 54-66 (Supp. 1999) and has been
reproduced here with the permission of the co-author and copyright holder, Bruce
Zagaris. All text and citations remain the same as in the original. Note that the
subheadings and footnote numbers have been changed to conform to the format of this
article. Please also note that, as of March 1, 2005, thirty-three countries had acceded
to the Inter-American Corruption Convention, discussed below. In addition, the OAS
adopted the Mechanism for Follow-Up of the Convention in June 2001.
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Convention." 1 The agreement signals an important milestone in
fashioning international obligations to punish public corruption
and focusing hemispheric attention on uniform laws to regulate
and prevent transnational corruption in procurement.442 In his
1995 document, A New Vision of the Organization of American
States, Secretary General Cesar Gavaria stated, "corruption is a
problem that seriously affects the legitimacy of democracy, dis-
torts the economic system, and contributes to social
disintegration."" 3
The preamble of the Inter-American Corruption Convention
states that the signatories are "convinced that corruption under-
mines the legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society,
moral order and justice, as well as at the comprehensive develop-
ment of peoples."444 The preamble provides that it is the signato-
ries' responsibility "to hold corrupt persons accountable in order to
combat corruption."445
The Inter-American Corruption Convention arose from an ini-
tiative to combat corruption through legal, institutional, and edu-
cational aspects; relations with civil society; and relations with
like-minded international organizations and NGOs.446
The Inter-American Corruption Convention has among its
purposes the promotion, strengthening, and development by sig-
natories of mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish, and end
corruption; and the promotion, facilitation, and regulation of coop-
eration among the signatories to guarantee the effectiveness of
anti-corruption measures and actions." 7
441. Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, Specialized Conference on the Draft Inter-American Convention against
Corruption, Mar. 27-29, 1996, Caracas, Venezuela, OEC/Ser.K/XXXIV.1 CICOR/
doc.14/96 rev. 2, Mar. 29, 1996; 35 I.L.M. 724 (1997) [hereinafter Inter-American
Corruption Convention].
442. For background on the signing, see Thomas W. Lippman, After 20-Year
Campaign, U.S. Balks at OAS Pact Against Business Corruption, WASIH. POST, Apr. 7,
1996, at Al.
443. For an incisive analysis of the Convention, see Konstantinos D. Magliveras, A
Critical Analysis of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 13 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 327, 327 (1997).
444. Inter-American Corruption Convention preamble, supra note 441, at 727.
445. Id.
446. See Working Group on Probity and Public Ethics, Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States, Fundamentals of a Possible Program for Inter-
American Cooperation in the Fight Against Corruption, OEA/Ser.G CP/GT/PEC-29/96,
Jan. 22, 1996.
447. See Inter-American Corruption Convention art. II, supra note 441, at 728.
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2. Required Criminalization of Selected Conduct
The Inter-American Corruption Convention requires signato-
ries to criminalize both domestic and foreign bribery and take
measures to combat the illicit enrichment of government officials.
The domestic bribery provisions target both the offeror and the
recipient of a bribe. The foreign bribery provisions target the
offeror alone. The illicit enrichment provisions are directed at the
recipient.
a. Certain "Acts of Corruption"
If they have not already done so, signatories are required to
criminalize "acts of corruption."44 The Inter-American Corruption
Convention defines acts of corruption as: (1) the solicitation or
acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a government official or a
person who does public functions, of a bribe;49 (2) offering or
granting a bribe; (3) improper acts or omissions by public officials
for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a
third party; (4) fraudulent use or concealment of property derived
from any of the acts to which the Article refers; and (5)
conspiracy. °
b. Transnational Bribery
Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of
its legal system, the Inter-American Corruption Convention
requires each signatory to prohibit and criminalize the offering or
granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, residents, and
businesses domiciled in such country, to a government official of
another country, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit,
such as a gift, favor, promise, or advantage, in connection with
any economic or commercial transaction, in exchange for any act
or omission in the performance of that official's public functions.451
Signatories that have not criminalized transnational bribery
must, insofar as their laws permit, cooperate with other signato-
448. Id. art. VI, at 729.
449. One of the open questions is whether this provision includes corporate
criminal liability, in the event the offer was made by a company or entity. See
Konstantinos Magliveras, The Implementation of the 1991 EC Directives on Money
Laundering in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, 8 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 89, 93
& n.60 (1995).
450. See Inter-American Corruption Convention art. IV(1), supra note 1, at 729.
451. See id. art. VIII, at 730.
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Subject to the Constitution and the fundamental principals of
its legal system, each signatory must criminalize "illicit enrich-
ment." Hence, each signatory must take measures to establish as
an offense under its laws "a significant increase in the assets of a
government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation
to his lawful earnings during the performance of his functions."453
In addition, each signatory must, insofar as its laws permit, pro-
vide assistance and cooperation with respect to this offense as pro-
vided in the Inter-American Corruption Convention.454 The illicit
enrichment provision was agreed upon during the last negotiating
session. It precipitated controversy because it appears to shift the
burden of proof from the government to the suspect, raising the
question of the validity of such provisions under the constitutional
requirements of some countries such as the United States.455
3. Conditional Criminalization of Selected Conduct
In addition to the aforementioned binding obligations, the
Inter-American Corruption Convention requires signatories to
consider other measures of good governance and other anti-cor-
ruption provisions, including the establishment of additional
offenses.
a. Additional "Acts of Corruption"
The Signatories agreed to consider criminalizing four other
acts of corruption 456 to promote uniformity among themselves and
to accomplish the purposes of the Inter-American Corruption Con-
vention. These additional acts of corruption include: (1) the
452. See id.
453. Id. art. IX, at 730.
454. See id.
455. Initially the United States, much to the surprise and dismay of the other
signatories, declined to sign, explaining that it never signs on the spot when the
treaty has been changed in last-minute negotiations, as occurred with the insertion of
illicit enrichment provisions. The State Department had to persuade the Justice
Department that the language added to the agreement is not contrary to
constitutional concerns. See Twenty-one OAS Members Conclude Anti-Corruption
Agreement, 12 IN'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 194, 194-95 (1996).
456. The Convention states that these offenses will be considered acts of corruption
for purposes of the Convention. See Inter-American Corruption Convention art. XI(2),
supra note 1, at 730.
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improper use of information by government officials for their own
benefit; (2) the improper use of public property by a government
official; (3) an act or omission by any person, personally or through
a third party, to obtain a decision from a public authority whereby
he obtains for himself or for another any benefit or gain; and (4)
the diversion by a government official, for purposes unrelated to
those for which they were-intended, for his own benefit or that of a
third party, of any property that such official received because of




The signatories agreed to consider the applicability of twelve
measures within their own institutional system to create, main-
tain and strengthen prevention measures. These measures can be
placed into four primary areas for discussion purposes: (1) trans-
parency and accountability in government; (2) ethical standards
for government officials; (3) regulations applicable to private con-
cerns; and (4) oversight and regulatory measures.
(1) Transparency and Accountability in Government
Signatories must consider measures relating to transparency
and accountability in government functions, especially procure-
ment. These measures include those relating to government pro-
curement and government hiring processes to ensure their
"openness, equity, and efficiency," and similar measures relating
to government revenue collection and control systems that deter
corruption. Signatories must also consider measures to create,
maintain, and strengthen systems to register the income, assets,
and liabilities of persons who perform public functions in certain
posts and, where appropriate, to make such registrations public."
(2) Ethical Standards for Government Officials
Signatories must consider measures to create, maintain, and
strengthen ethical rules applicable to public officials. In particu-
lar, these include: standards of conduct for the correct, honorable,
and proper fulfillment of public functions; standards to prevent
conflicts of interest; standards to require the proper conservation
and use of resources entrusted to government officials; and stan-
457. See id. art. XI(1), at 730.
458. See id. art. III, at 728.
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dards to require government officials to report acts of corruption
to the appropriate authorities.4 59
i. Measures Applicable to Private Concerns, Including
Denying Tax Deductibility of Bribes
Signatories must consider measures to create, maintain, and
strengthen safeguards against corrupt activities by private per-
sons. In particular, signatories must consider laws to deny
favorable tax treatment for expenses made in violation of the anti-
corruption laws of signatories. 46 0 They must consider mechanisms
to ensure that publicly-held companies and similar organizations
maintain books and records that, in reasonable detail, correctly
reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets and provide inter-
nal accounting controls to enable their officers to detect corrupt
acts.461 Signatories must also consider measures to protect public
servants and private citizens who report acts of corruption (i.e.,
whistleblowers), including protection of their identities, in accor-
dance with the basic principles of signatories' domestic legal
systems.462
ii. Oversight and Regulatory Measures
Signatories must consider measures to promote the anti-cor-
ruption effort, including the establishment of anti-corruption over-
sight bodies to implement modern mechanisms for preventing,
detecting, punishing and eliminating corrupt acts, programs to
encourage broader involvement by civil society and NGOs in the
anti-corruption effort, and additional measures to take into
account the relationship between equitable compensation and pro-
bity in public service.463
4. Jurisdiction
Each signatory must adopt measures to establish jurisdiction
over the offenses it has established in accordance with the Inter-
American Corruption Convention when the offense in question is
committed in its territory. 4 For instance, each signatory must
assume jurisdiction over an offense when the offense is committed
459. See id.
460. See Inter-American Corruption Convention art. 111(7), supra note 441, at 728.
461. See id. art. III(10), at 728.
462. See id. art. 111(8), at 728.
463. See id. arts. 111(9), (11), (12), at 728.
464. See id. art. V(1), at 728.
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by one of its nationals or by a person who habitually resides in its
territory.465
In the event a person who has committed an offense under the
Inter-American Corruption Convention is present in its territory,
and the signatory does not extradite such person to another coun-
try on the ground of the defendant's nationality, it must assume
jurisdiction over the alleged offense.466
5. Penalties
The Inter-American Corruption Convention does not require
any measures to harmonize either penalties or approaches to
imposing penalties. This contrasts with other multilateral con-
ventions, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the
United Nations Vienna Drug Convention,467 which contains mea-
sures to harmonize sentencing approaches.
6. International Cooperation
Following the lead of many other multilateral conventions
dealing with transnational crimes, the Inter-American Corruption
Convention requires that signatories provide mutual assistance in
criminal matters and extradition with respect to the covered
offenses. Signatories must not invoke bank secrecy laws as an
excuse not to provide assistance sought by the requesting state.68
Subject to the constitutional principles and domestic laws of
each state and existing treaties between the signatories, the fact
that the alleged act of corruption was committed before the Inter-
American Corruption Convention entered into force will not pre-
clude procedural cooperation in criminal matters between the sig-
natories. However, the provision does not affect the principle of
non-retroactivity in criminal law, nor does it interrupt existing
statutes of limitations relating to crimes committed prior to the
date of entry into force of the Inter-American Corruption
Convention.469
a. Mutual and Judicial Assistance
In accordance with their domestic laws and applicable trea-
465. See id. art. V(2), at 728.
466. See id. art. V(3), at 728.
467. See, e.g., The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances art. 3(4)-(7).
468. Inter-American Corruption Convention art. XVI, supra note 441, at 733.
469. See id. art. XIX, at 732.
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ties, signatories must afford one another the "widest measure of
mutual assistance" by processing requests from authorities to
investigate or prosecute the acts of corruption mentioned in the
Inter-American Corruption Convention. These measures must be
taken to obtain evidence and take other necessary action to facili-
tate legal proceedings and measures regarding the investigation
or prosecution of acts of corruption.47 °
Signatories must also provide each other the widest measure
of mutual technical cooperation on the most effective ways of
preventing, detecting, investigating, and punishing acts of corrup-
tion. They must develop information exchanges through agree-
ments and meetings between competent bodies and institutions,
and pay special attention to methods and procedures that afford
citizen participation in anticorruption efforts.4 71
An investigated state cannot invoke bank secrecy as a basis
for refusal to provide assistance sought by the requesting state.4 72
This is found in many recent anti-money laundering conventions
and model regulations. 3 The requesting state must not use any
information received that is protected by bank secrecy for any pur-
pose other than the proceeding for which that information was
requested, unless authorized by the investigated state. 474 Hence,
the requesting state, if it requests information protected by bank
secrecy for a criminal proceeding, would not be able to use the
information in a second proceeding (e.g., civil forfeiture unless
arguably it is considered a continuing procedure) or to transmit
the information to a third country that is also investigating the
same persons and/or transactions.
b. Extradition
Signatories agree to apply extradition provisions in the Inter-
American Corruption Convention to the corruption offenses that
signatories must criminalize. 475 The signatories must include such
offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be
470. Id. art. XIV(1), at 732..
471. See id. art. XIV(2), at 732.
472. See id. art. XVI(1), at 732.
473. See, e.g., 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances art. 7(5); The 1990 Council of Europe Convention
on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime art. 4(1);
Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System
for the Purpose of Money Laundering (91/308/EEC), preamble.
474. See Inter-American Corruption Convention art. XVI(2), supra note 441, at 732.
475. See id. arts. XIII(1)-(2), at 731.
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concluded between or among them.476 A signatory that makes
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty may consider
the Inter-American Corruption Convention as the legal basis for
extradition with respect to any offense to which the article
applies.477 Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty must recognize offenses to which the Inter-
American Corruption Convention's extradition provisions apply as
extraditable offenses among themselves.4"'
If a signatory refuses extradition solely on the basis of the
nationality of the person sought or because the investigated state
believes it has jurisdiction over the offense, it must submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution
unless otherwise agreed with the requesting state.479
c. Asset Forfeiture
In accordance with applicable domestic laws and relevant
treaties or other agreements, signatories must provide each other
the broadest possible measure of assistance in the identification,
tracing, freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of property or proceeds
obtained, derived from or used in the commission of offenses
established in accordance with the Inter-American Corruption
Convention.48 ° To the extent it deems appropriate, a signatory
that enforces its own or another signatory's forfeiture judgment
against property or proceeds must dispose of the property or pro-
ceeds in accordance with its laws. To the extent allowed by its
laws and on such terms as it deems appropriate, a signatory may
transfer all or part of such property or proceeds to another signa-
tory that assisted in the underlying investigation or
proceedings.4""
7. Entry into Force, Ratification, and Implementation
The Inter-American Corruption Convention provides that the
ratification of only two countries is required for it to enter into
force.4 82 In ratifying the Inter-American Corruption Convention,
signatories may take reservations, provided such reservations are
476. See id. art. XIII(2), at 731.
477. See id. art. XIII(3), at 731.
478. See id. art. XIII(4), at 731.
479. See Inter-American Corruption Convention art. XIII(6), supra note 1, at 731.
480. See id. art. XV(1), at 732.
481. See id. art. XV(2), at 734.
482. See id. art. XXV, at 734.
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not incompatible with the "object and purpose of the Conven-
tion."483 If a signatory finds that the obligations requiring it to
enact the transnational bribery and illicit enrichment provisions
of the Inter-American Corruption Convention would violate its
Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, it
may avoid the requirements to criminalize these offenses without
making a reservation.
In March 1997, approximately 7 months after its signing, the
OAS translated 4 conformed versions into the 4 different official
languages. By August 1998, ten countries had ratified the Inter-
American Corruption Convention.4 4 Instead of preparing a model
implementing law for the OAS, the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee decided initially to limit itself to drafting clauses that are
relevant. The slow progress of the OAS on the implementation of
the Inter-American Corruption Convention is due to its lack of
resources and the unwillingness of its members to provide
resources, or establish institutions to facilitate anti-criminal coop-
eration in the hemisphere.4"'
The Inter-American Corruption Convention does not contain
any oversight or monitoring mechanisms for the OAS. As a result,
each signatory has the discretion to implement the Inter-Ameri-
can Corruption Convention. However, because at least six signa-
tories - Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United
States - are also parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
which has monitoring provisions, their implementation of many of
the provisions will experience harmonization under the OECD.
Because of the importance of these six countries politically and
economically within the OAS, their implementation efforts may
have some influence on the implementation of the Inter-American
Corruption Convention.
On August 28, 1998, the Inter-American Juridical Committee,
an advisory body of the OAS, concluded its LIII session in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. During its deliberations, the Committee con-
cluded its preparatory work on model legislation on transnational
bribery based on its studies on anti-corruption and effective appli-
cation of the Inter-American Corruption Convention. The Com-
mittee also advanced its work toward the adoption of draft model
483. Id. art. XXIV, at 733.
484. See 2 TRANSPARENCY INT'L-UsA NEWSL. 2 (2d Quarter 1998).
485. See Twenty-nine Countries Agree on OECD Anti-Corruption Convention and




laws on unlawful enrichment as it debated several aspects of the
administration of justice in the Americas.486
At the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, the
leaders of the hemisphere entrusted the OAS with a range of
responsibilities. They decided to support the Inter-American Pro-
gram to Combat Corruption by taking the following actions: (1)
developing a strategy for ratification of the Inter-American Cor-
ruption Convention; (2) drafting codes of conduct for public
employees; (3) studying the problem of the laundering of assets
and proceeds derived from corruption; (4) promoting public aware-
ness of ethical values; (5) supporting a Symposium on Enhancing
Probity in the Hemisphere, (6) holding workshops to heighten
awareness of the standards established by the Convention; (7)
establishing a mechanism to follow up on progress within the
Inter-American Corruption Convention; (8) taking under consider-
ation proposals developed at the OAS Meeting of Government;
and (9) sending representatives to a conference on contributions to
electoral campaigns, held in February 1998.487
Seeking to develop momentum from the Americas Business
Forum, Transparency International-USA proposed that the U.S.
government make the conclusion of a transparency agreement one
of the priorities of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
"business facilitation measures" for implementation by the year
2000. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has indicated
that it will propose that the FTAA Trade Negotiating Committee
support the proposal. At present, Mercosur is likely to oppose the
idea and insist on strict adherence to the FTAA principle of a "sin-
gle undertaking" to be implemented in 2005.488
8. Potential Alliances with IGOs and NGOs
The preliminary work of the Inter-American Corruption Con-
vention contemplates a possible program that "should encompass
the legal, institutional, and educational aspects, relations with
civil society, relations with other international organizations
working to combat corruption, and with NGOs interested in the
subject." Among the institutional goals of the work is to: analyze
486. See OAS, Weekly Report, Aug. 31, 1998.
487. See OAS, II Summit of the Americas (Santiago, Chile), The OAS After the
Santiago Summit (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http://www.oas.org/en/pinfo/week/summi2t.
htm>.
488. FTAA Agreement on Transparency, 2 TRANSPARENCY INT'L-USA NEWSL. 2 (2d
Quarter 1998).
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the legal structure of institutions responsible for combating cor-
ruption in signatory states; analyze the operational features of
such institutions; identify the role that legislatures can take in
combating corruption; analyze the role of the judiciary; and pro-
mote inter-institutional exchanges of experiences and information
through seminars, with a view to establishing a hemispheric net-
work comprising the participating institutions.
The anti-corruption work program of the OAS includes gov-
ernment relations with civil institutions, such as: strengthening
freedom of expression and freedom of the press to control corrup-
tion; strengthening ethical values; coordination with national and
international NGOs involved in anti-corruption activities, includ-
ing professional associations; and analysis of educational pro-
grams to promote behavior that counteracts corruption and
affirms ethical values. On June 17, 1998, the OAS signed a Coop-
eration Agreement with Transparency International-USA, creat-
ing a framework for future cooperation.489
The OAS work program aims to coordinate its actions with
international governmental organizations (IGOs), including the
OECD, the European Council, World Bank Group, Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), and the United Nations. A coordinated
effort was proposed to exchange experiences and develop joint
actions to allow the subject to become a common interest among
many regions and become closely related to the objectives of these
institutions.490 The OAS and IDB already are planning confer-
ences in fifteen countries to promote further ratification and
implementation of the Inter-American Corruption Convention.491
9. Observations
Many members of the international community considered
the Inter-American Corruption Convention a personal triumph for
Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera,492 who had promoted it for
many years following the failures of some of the major banks in
Venezuela and allegations of corruption that led to those failures.
The Inter-American Corruption Convention illustrates the
489. See Highlights, 2 TRANSPARENCY INT'L-UsA NEWSL. 1 (2d Quarter 1998).
490. See Fundamentals of a Possible Program for Inter-American Cooperation in the
Fight Against Corruption, Permanent Council of the OAS, Working Group on Probity
and Public Ethics, OEA/Ser.G CP/GT/PEC-39/96 (Jan. 22, 1996).
491. See OAS Anti-Corruption Convention, 2 TRANSPARENCY INT'L-USA NEWSL. 3 (2d
Quarter 1998).
492. See Caldera Tries to Give Regional Anti-Corruption Effort a Push, 10 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 404 (1994).
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momentum that has developed in the effort to combat official cor-
ruption. International organizations, such as the OAS, the IDB,
and the OECD, are playing a leading role in these efforts. A criti-
cal element in the future success of the Inter-American Corrup-
tion Convention will be whether the signatories will be willing and
able to provide mechanisms to facilitate and/or require
enforcement.
On March 9, 1998, the Leadership Council for Inter-American
Summitry issued a report, From Talk to Action: How Summits
Can Forge a Western Hemisphere Community of Prosperous
Democracy, urging the formation of an Inter-American Commis-
sion on Corruption to promote implementation of the 1996 Inter-
American Corruption Convention. The Commission would moni-
tor implementation of priority goals, circulate model legislation
and examples of best practices, and help coordinate technical
aid.493
The recommendation points to the absence of meaningful
institutions and mechanisms to implement the Inter-American
Corruption Convention. Although establishing mechanisms are
desirable, the effort to create such mechanisms on an ad hoc basis
means that increasingly the hemisphere has laws, regulations,
and guidelines on issues including narcotics control, anti-money
laundering, anti-terrorism, and transnational corruption. How-
ever, the absence of substantial mechanisms and institutions pre-
clude the harmonious design and integration of the laws and
policies, effective implementation and enforcement of such poli-
cies, and the ability to meet the daily needs to adjust, interpret,
and educate law enforcement officials and policy makers about
their application.
D. Narcotics Trafficking
As mentioned in the earlier discussion of the OAS, the treat-
ment of international narcotics trafficking represents the boldest
experiment in devoting resources and institutional mechanisms to
combat one transnational crime problem.4 4 The transnational
crime of narcotics trafficking remains an issue that will continue
to receive the focus, resources, and most creative efforts for insti-
tutional reform and experiment in the transnational crime area,
in part because it has been the recipient of so many resources and
493. See Marc Selinger, Speed Up FTAA Negotiations, Advisory Group's Report
Says, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC., Mar. 10, 1998, at A6.
494. See Tragen, supra note 196, at 162.
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diplomatic efforts through the CICAD meetings. CICAD is both
the source of important experiments in its own right, such as the
adoption of the multi-evaluation system, and of important experi-
ments in related criminal cooperation that will develop on their
own, regardless of the outcome of counter-drug policy. For
instance, efforts to combat arms trafficking and anti-money laun-
dering policies, while they arose out of CICAD, are becoming
important on their own and may even eclipse counter-drug policy
in terms of the importance and resource allocation.
VIII. NEED FOR AN AMERICAS COMMITTEE
ON CRIME PROBLEMS
Meaningful enforcement initiatives against transnational
crime should be based on a comprehensive criminal justice policy
and permanent, ongoing work by dedicated civil servants under
high level political leaders and criminal justice professionals. For
illustration purposes, on a hemispheric level, the United States
and other governments should consider the creation of an Ameri-
cas Committee on Crime Problems.495
The Americas Committee would be tasked with solving hemi-
spheric criminal problems.496 Americas Committee membership
should be open to member nations of the OAS.497 In addition,
other countries and entities in the hemisphere should be consid-
ered for membership, such as "Canada, Cuba, and the important
international organizations, including non-governmental organi-
zations, which have been active in international criminal coopera-
tion and criminal justice planning. "49s
A good format for the Americas Committee to follow would be
that of the European Committee on Crime Problems.4" "The
European Committee is composed primarily of senior officials of
the Ministries of Justice in the member European states who have
worked on exchanging experiences and coordinating research
495. See generally B. Zagaris & C. Papavizas, Using the Organization of American
States to Control International Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REV.
INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 119-32 (1986) (suggesting an organization like CICAD as a first
step towards an Americas Committee on Crime Problems).
496. Id. at 124.
497. Id.
498. Id. An example of such an organization is the United Nations Institute for
NUD. Id.
499. Id. The European Committee of Crime Problems was established by decision
of Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in June, 1958. Id.
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relating to the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders. '0 °
The European Committee has five fundamental tasks.50 1
First, the European Committee must meet once every year and
establish policy and strategies for "related bodies such as the
Criminological Scientific Council."5 2 Second, it creates specialized
expert subcommittees, whose duties include creating draft resolu-
tion and conference proposals for the European Committee. 03 Any
draft proposals that the European Committee accepts are then
sent on to the Council of Europe, and then to member govern-
ments. 04 Third, the European Committee supports criminological
research.0 5 Fourth, the European Committee organizes "special-
ized [crime-related] topical conferences such as the Conference of
Directors of Prison Administrations."5 6 Fifth and finally, the
European Committee is "instrumental in the regular convening of
a Conference of European Ministers of Justice," which has met
every two years since 1961.7
Assuming that the Americas Committee would be established
under the auspices of the OAS, the Committee could be created by
the agreement of the Ministers of Justice of respective OAS mem-
bers.0 "Since matters of international criminal cooperation con-
cern policy matters as well as technical maters," the Americas
Committee on Crime Problems would greatly benefit from at least
initial (if not sustained) assistance from the Ministries of Justice
and foreign ministries.509 The Americas Committee's efforts would
probably have to be regulated by regular meetings (preferably
annual) and eventually by an administrative body staffed by
senior Ministries of Justice officials. 10 The Americas Committee
would also probably have to establish and expand "its own special-
ized resources on international criminal conventions and criminal
justice planning." 1 Initially, assistance with technical issues
500. Id.




505. Id. Such support is often given through organizations created by the
European Committee, such as the Criminological Scientific Council. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
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could be provided by well-informed and experienced nations,
international organizations, and non-governmental organiza-
tions.512
An important initial duty of the Americas Committee would
be to evaluate current international criminal cooperation mecha-
nisms in an effort to assure large-scale coordination. 13 The scope
of the charter of the Americas Committee should include all crimi-
nal law and justice matters facing the hemisphere, including
crime prevention, crime detection, and criminal justice develop-
ment planning.1 4
In addition, the Americas Committee could evaluate "legal,
administrative, and judicial measures taken in the member states
in fighting specific crime areas for innovation worthy of emula-
tion."5 '5 Thus, it would be the Americas Committee's duty to make
recommendations for new regulations and policies and for estab-
lishing new domestic or international organizations.516 This could
be done, for instance, in the form of drafting uniform rules, which
would be presented to member nations for adoption.1 7 All this
would be done to facilitate improved hemispheric and interna-
tional cooperation.1 '
At present, governments in the region are liberalizing
their rules regarding trade and investment as well as the
movement of people. Examples are the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement and the North America Free Trade
Agreement. While these agreements have several provi-
sions on criminal cooperation, these provisions are limited
to intellectual property protection and customs enforce-
ment, and it is clear that criminal justice and criminal
cooperation are neglected issues. As a result, governments
are facilitating the easy movement of illegitimate, as well
as legitimate, goods, people, and capital. Criminal syndi-
cates are doing well. Rather than an after-the-fact reaction
to individual problems, such as drugs, corruption, arms
trafficking, and money laundering, governments must cre-
ate mechanisms to enable themselves to view crime just as
it is viewed by criminals - as a business with vast opportu-
nities and networking possibilities. Indeed, free trade and
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 125-126.






globalization compel innovative approaches to criminal
cooperation .... [Therefore, tihe Americas Committee on
Crime Problems is an idea worth exploring.5
19
IX. ANALYSIS AND PROSPECTS520
As transnational criminals and criminal groups inevitably
take advantage of opportunities flowing from globalization, the
traditional actors in international relations - the nation-states
and international organizations - will be challenged to maintain
their power. Either they will be able to adapt their conception of
international organizational theory to account for and counter
new international criminal actors, or they will eventually find
themselves unable to effectively counter corrupt practices. In a
worst case scenario the international system will become infected
by the poison of criminal groups.
International lawyers, foreign relations experts, and criminol-
ogists must become multidisciplinary in their vision and strategic
planning, flexible in their ability to form alliances, and able to
construct methods of interaction between each other and to
develop their own networks, while deflating those of criminal
groups. 2' Until national governments establish effective regional
organizations, the mandate and resources to intensively and regu-
larly work on criminal justice planning at the international level,
individual states will react in a disorganized and inefficient man-
ner to crime. Regional organizations, through uniform laws, trea-
ties, agreements, memoranda of understanding, institutions, and
other ways of cooperating in the battle against crime, may suc-
ceed. To effectively battle crime in this high-tech era requires a
pro-active, comprehensive, and visionary approach to criminal
justice. 22
519. Bruce Zagaris, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can
International Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic Stability? Constructing
a Hemispheric Initiative Against Transnational Crime, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1888,
1900-1902 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
520. This section appeared in Zagaris & Ohri, supra note 440, at 89-93 and has
been reproduced here with the permission of the co-author and copyright holder,
Bruce Zagaris. All text and citations remain the same as in the original. Note that
the footnote numbers have been changed to conform to the format of this article.
521. For a discussion of the need for alliance-building in international criminal and
regulatory areas, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN
AFFS. 183, 183-97 (1997).
522. For a discussion of more comprehensive anti-crime regime development
applied to the Americas, see Bruce Zagaris, Constructing a Hemispheric Initiative
Against Transnational Crime, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1888-1902 (1996); Bruce Zagaris
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The global community, in developing and implementing inter-
national regimes on transnational corruption, is searching for
more effective mechanisms to implement their goals and strate-
gies. The challenges are many. Transnational corruption involves
efforts to overcome decades and even centuries of embedded pat-
terns of conduct, power, and economics. New concepts of behavior
and laws will not overcome the longstanding barriers overnight.
Indeed, unless the effort to construct an anti-corruption enforce-
ment regime has popular support and overcomes the disparity of
economic and political power nationally and transnationally, the
corruption that arose under the Castilian institutions of the
residencia and the visita,23 whereby the Spanish Crown tried to
impose its will on the actions of distant officials in the New World,
will continue evolving and manifesting itself in different forms.
Without substantial popular support, the development of a broad
alliance, and effective mechanisms, many national and local gov-
ernments may be inspired to devise ways to defeat the anti-cor-
ruption regime through passive resistance and other means so
that observers may characterize the conduct with the famous
Spanish dictum, Obedezco pero no cumplo (I obey but do not carry
out).52
4
One mechanism is to develop self- and mutual evaluations,
emulating the efforts of the Financial Action Task Force to
develop an anti-money laundering regime. 25 The lack of authority
and implementation mechanisms for comprehensive crime and
international criminal cooperation policy - not just to combat
transnational corruption - are repeated on regional and subre-
gional levels with the exception of the EU. For instance, in the
Western Hemisphere an important gap exists between the num-
ber of formal mechanisms and regimes that facilitate free trade
and compensating mechanisms to regulate the potential criminal
threats from the unfettered movement of goods, capital, informa-
& Constantine Papavizas, Using the Organization of American States to Control
International Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REV. INT'L DE DROIT
PENAL 119-33 (1986).
523. The residencia was a judicial review of the Spanish American's officials in the
New World conduct at the end of his term of office, and visita could occur without
warning at any time during the period of an official's incumbency because of a serious
emergency or a general condition of mismanagement. See C.H. HARING, THE SPANISH
EMPIRE IN AMERICA 138-46 (1952).
524. For background on the dictum, see John Edwin Fagg, LATIN AMERICA: A
GENERAL HISTORY 227 (1967).
525. See WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNTER-MEASURES 108-11 (1995).
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tion, and people that free trade facilitates.526
While the countries in the Americas have undertaken various
new commitments to the new criminal areas that involve transna-
tional organized crime, they have not provided for new resources
within or outside the OAS to undertake the responsibilities.
Although the Inter-American Corruption Convention was con-
cluded almost two years before its counterpart in the OECD, the
Americas are further behind in implementing the OAS
Convention.
Part of the problem is that the group charged with providing
most of the work on the convention's implementation, the Inter-
American Juridical Committee, is composed of expert volunteers
who meet only twice a year. Established by Chapter XII, the
Inter-American Juridical Committee acts as the advisory body to
the OAS on juridical matters and is responsible for promoting the
development and codification of international law. The Committee
is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro. It is composed of eleven
jurists (nationals of the member states) elected by the General
Assembly from panels of candidates presented by the members. 27
Their work is only ad referendum, that is, the OAS requests them
to undertake certain tasks. The Committee does not have its own
resources. 528
At the Santiago Summit, the heads of government, in recogni-
tion of the importance of, and positive role played by hemispheric
institutions, especially the OAS, instructed the Ministers to
examine the strengthening and modernizing of these institu-
tions. 529 This recognition complements the Santiago Commitment
to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System,
approved by the OAS General Assembly on June 4, 1991, in which
the OAS members noted that the depolarization and lessening of
world tensions had led the way to "concerted action by all coun-
tries through global and regional organizations" and they declared
"their firm resolve to stimulate the renewal of the Organization of
American States, to make it more effective and useful inthe appli-
526. For a comparison between criminal justice cooperation in Europe and the
Western Hemisphere in the wake of free trade, see Ethan Nadelmann,
Harmonization of Criminal Justice Systems, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 247-78 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1993).
527. See VIRON L. VAKY & HERALDO MUNOZ, THE FUTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES 117 (1993).
528. Phone Interview on May 7, 1998, with Keith Highet, member of the Inter-
American Juridical Committee.
529. See Santiago Summit Declaration, at 4.
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cation of its guiding principles and for the attainment of its
objectives." 5 °
Clearly, the new architecture of the Americas in the wake of
globalization and the explosion of regional free trade groups is
murky. Regionalism in the Americas in the next century will not
reflect the traditional patterns of regionalism of the 1970s or
1980s. It will be a function of the national policies of the countries
of the hemisphere and the various strategies toward regionalism
and sub-regionalism that they represent. In turn, these strategies
will be related to their positions in the larger hierarchy of power
and trade in the Americas.5"' In the short run, free trade and
globalization will increase opportunities for transnational
criminals, especially organized crime groups, to move money,
goods, people, and technology for their own ends. Eventually, gov-
ernments will react, first to individual crimes and eventually on a
more comprehensive basis.
The sophisticated transformations of law and culture man-
dated by the development of an anti-corruption enforcement
regime require know-how, significant resources, substantial politi-
cal commitment, training, and economic benefits. To the extent
extra-regional players facilitate governments and regional organi-
zations to control and evolve the new regime of international anti-
corruption enforcement, the regime will be able to successfully
combat transnational criminals. Strategic planners should not
regard transnational corruption and related crime as static.
Many of the perpetrators are clever. They have significant and
even enormous resources. They are willing to make alliances with
other criminal groups and even with governments and political
leaders when such alliances are beneficial. Unless regional orga-
nizations representing diverse countries in the hemisphere and
extraregional forces in support of the anti-corruption regime
become equally as dynamic as their opponents in devising new
mechanisms, cooperative activities, and overcoming traditional
barriers, they will see their power eroded and the international
system will become increasingly infected.
Small governments and extraregional players must facilitate
global governance that encourages a shift of power and functions
530. Viron L. Vaky, The Organization of American States and Multilateralism in
the Americas, in VAKY & MUNOZ, supra note 527, at 1, 12-13 (text of the Santiago
Commitment in app. 1).
531. See W. Andrew Axline, Conclusion: External Forces, State Strategies and
Regionalism in the Americas, FOREIGN POLICY & REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS 199,
214 (Gordon Mace & Jean-Philippe Therier eds., 1996).
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that occur away from the state - up, down, and sideways - to
supra-state, sub-state, and non-state actors.532 This power shift
must occur partly through networking and voluntary associations.
Global governance and a new world order are slowly replacing the
state, which is disaggregating into its separate, functionally dis-
tinct parts. These parts - courts, regulatory agencies (including
new ones such as financial investigative units), executives, and
even legislatures - are networking with their counterparts
regionally and extraregionally, creating a dense web of relations
that comprises a new, transgovernmental order. Current interna-
tional criminal and related problems - transnational corruption,
international drug trafficking, money laundering, transnational
organized crime, terrorism, bank fraud, cyber-crimes, and securi-
ties fraud - created and sustain these relations. Government
institutions have formed networks of their own, ranging from the
OECD Working Group on Bribery, the Basle Committee of Cen-
tral Bankers, to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on a uni-
versal level, and on a regional level, the European Committee on
Crime Problems, OAS Working Group on Probity and Public Eth-
ics, the Inter-Amercian Drug Abuse Control Committee's (CICAD)
group of money laundering experts, and the Caribbean FATF.
International organizations, governments, and NGOs must
facilitate networking among judges and other relevant officials, so
that they can start a global community of laws.533 They share val-
ues and interests based on their belief in the law as distinct but
not divorced from politics and their view of themselves as profes-
sionals who must be insulated from direct political influence. This
global community reminds each participant that his or her profes-
sional performance is being monitored or supported by a larger
audience. 4
Our hemisphere needs leadership to achieve the goals of its
international anti-corruption enforcement regime. The people of
the hemisphere must roll up their sleeves and work together to
532. See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFFS. 50, 50-66 (1997)
(discussing how the nation-state is becoming obsolete as the resources and threats
that matter disregard governments and borders and states are sharing powers that
defined their sovereignty with corporations, international bodies, and a proliferating
universe of citizens groups).
533. For a discussion of integration within the intra-Caribbean system and
transnational functional relations, e.g., in anti-narcotics action, justice and human
rights, currencies, finance and banks, see CHRISTOPH MULLER, CARICOM
INTEGRATION PROGRESS AND HURDLES: A EUROPEAN VIEW 84-135 (1996).
534. See Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFS. 183,
183-87 (1997).
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develop effective mechanisms, institutions and civil society, in
which honest procurement, business, and good governance are
essential elements.
